Empirical analysis of financial vehicles at the nonprofit/for-profit boundary of science and engineering by Wood, Sarah J
The Role of Philanthropic Capital in Entrepreneurship:
An empirical analysis of financial vehicles at the nonprofit/for-profit
boundary of science and engineering
by
Sarah J. Wood
B.S. Commerce
University of Virginia, 2007
SUBMITTED TOTHE ENGINEERING SYSTEMS DIVISION IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY
AT THE
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
SEPTEMBER 2012
© 2012 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. All rights reserved.
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly
paper and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part in any medium
now known or hereafter created.
Signature of Author:
Certified by:
"Lgineering Systems Division
August 10, 2012
Fiona Murray
David Sarnoff Pr essor of Managemen and Technology
Thesis Supervisor
(-N
Accepted by:
I Joel P. Clark
Professor of Materials Systems
Acting Director, Technology and Policy Program
HU7LTT iN SITUTE
0CT 24 212
R 7F !'3
2
The Role of Philanthropic Capital in Entrepreneurship:
An empirical analysis of financial vehicles at the nonprofit/for-profit
boundary of science and engineering
by
Sarah J. Wood
Submitted to the Engineering Systems Division on August 10, 2012 in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree of Master of Science in
Technology and Policy
ABSTRACT
Not-for-profit funding from wealthy individuals and their foundations is widely used to
support science and engineering research within the university, but is not currently
being used to fund the translation of those ideas towards greater impact.
Entrepreneurship is a powerful engine for moving from idea to impact, but for-profit
investments in early-stage companies fail to account for investors' charitable objectives
and are not rewarded for social returns. Conversely, tax-shielded "charitable" funds are
rarely used in for-profit technology companies regardless of their desirable social
outcomes. As a result, there is often a limited amount of capital available to companies
in areas such as energy, water and human disease because neither pure philanthropic
nor pure profit motives sufficiently justify investment. Traditional explanations for funding
gaps fail to recognize that the shortfall due to both the risk profile of potential
investments, and the poor match between the social and private interests of "investors"
and the types of vehicles that might allow a mix of philanthropic and financial motives
to sit side-by-side.
To address this challenge, we asked a simple question: What financial approaches and
organizational structures can be deployed at the intersection of the non-profit and for-
profit boundary to address the funding gaps in science and engineering
commercialization? To explore this issue, we conducted interviews, reviewed legal texts
and relevant literature, and compiled data from online sources. Our findings reveal a
sophisticated set of tools that are historically under-used, but which have the potential
to advance many areas of science and engineering that hold solutions to global issues,
such as health, environment, water, and energy.
Thesis Supervisor: Fiona Murray
Title: David Sarnoff Professor of Management and Technology
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CASE STUDY: Liquid Metal Battery Corporation
At first glance, the formation of the Liquid Metal Battery Corporation (LMBC) from the
lab of Professor Donald Sadoway at MIT appears to be a typical story of university-led
engineering innovation: brilliant professor shares eureka moment with capable student,
student toils away in dark basement lab for half a decade, small-scale prototype
eventually works, a business incorporates, and group moves off campus to try to save
the world (and maybe make some money). But dig deeper and the LMBC story
becomes one of a surprising but increasingly widespread combination of philanthropy,
public and private capital. Rather than simply relying on investors driven by financial
returns, the founders of LMBC were able to patch-together funding from wealthy
individuals that chose to support the public-good creation efforts of the company in
ways more akin to philanthropy and whose decisions mixed financial and social returns
in complex and variable ways.
The story of LMBC is one example of a burgeoning trend among high-net worth
individuals to engage not simply in scientific philanthropy by making gifts and grants to
universities but also to engage in philanthropy targeted towards the commercialization
of science and the translation from idea to impact via company formation. The
financial mechanisms that supported the Liquid Metal Battery team from idea
conception inside the university to incorporation and the translation of the idea beyond
the university provide a window into emerging patterns of funding allocation that are
particularly relevant to science, especially scientists and entrepreneurs in the life
sciences and clean technology whose goals are not only to further knowledge but also
to solve problems of significant social impact.
Below we follow the path of David Bradwell, Sadoway's primary researcher on the
liquid metal battery project, from 2006 through 2011 by examining invention disclosures,
team developments, and the technological roadmap of an idea that has already
garnered Bradwell a coveted spot on the 2010 TR35 (Technology Review's Top 35
Innovators Under 35) and over $30M in committed capital, shared between the
university lab at MIT and off campus with the Liquid Metal Battery Corporation. While
formally using traditional financing vehicles - grants and equity financing, informally, the
financing story is one of wealthy individuals making choices well beyond the traditional
calculus of grant-making or investment-making.
The Sadoway Lab
For over thirty years, Don Sadoway has steered the research endeavors of his lab with a
personal desire to reduce the carbon pollution output of various commercial industries,
including production and usage of batteries, as well as extraction of metals from their
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ores. When Sadoway joined the MIT faculty in 1977, the U.S. Bureau of Mines and the
U.S. Department of Energy, which had an interest in stable anodes for aluminum,
primarily funded his work. Unfortunately, during the Reagan Administration in the 1980s,
funding for science waned - a decline that Sadoway attributes to low oil prices
resulting from decreased Middle East oil imports to the U.S. from 1975 through 1982. In
the mean time, Sadoway's lab focused on metallurgy projects funded by the U.S. Navy,
which had an interest in making ships out of titanium.
It was not until Japan-based Furukawa Electric approached Sadoway in 1994 with an
offer of corporate sponsorship of university research that he pulled together a team of
collaborators - MIT Professors Gerbrand Ceder, Anne Mayes, Yet-Ming Chang, and
himself - to tackle new battery projects. As Sadoway himself shifted his focus to
teaching Introductory Chemistry to MIT Freshman, new government and industrial
partners started trickling in: NASA, American Iron & Steel Institute, and Brazil-based Vale
all initiated new projects between 1996 and 2003.
Prior to 2005, Sadoway had never employed more than five researchers at one time in
his lab nor collaborated with philanthropists or foundations for research funding. This is
unusual for an MIT laboratory with 30% of overall funding at the Institute coming from
philanthropic sources (directly or via the endowment) (Murray 2012).
When David Bradwell arrived at MIT in the fall of 2005, Sadoway had just begun "kicking
around the idea to put an aluminum smelter in reverse." Sadoway had come up with
the idea together with one of his collaborators, Ceder, who was on sabbatical during
Bradwell's one-year terminal master's degree program. Together Ceder and Sadoway
had already filed an invention disclosure with the MIT Technology Licensing Office, but it
wasn't until Bradwell defined criteria for usable materials, made a second invention
disclosure, and was added to the TLO case number that things really took off.
Desh Deshpande: founding a center for seed money to university research
In the summer of 2006, Bradwell decided to stay on to work for Sadoway as a visiting
scientist and was granted the money to do so. He chose to apply for a grant that
changed the funding trend for Group Sadoway - he selected to apply for funding from
a new source on campus, the Deshpande Center for Technological Innovation. The
Deshpande Center was established at the MIT School of Engineering in 2002 to increase
the impact of MIT technologies in the commercial marketplace. One couple, Jairee
and Desh Deshpande, ignited the program with a founding gift of $20 million.
After starting Cascade Communications with $1,000, selling it for $3.7 billion, and then
founding Sycamore Networks, which at the time boasted the fourth-largest IPO of all
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time, Deshpande fit the profile of the neo-philanthropist: young compared to his
philanthropic predecessors (he was 51 when he founded the Deshpande Center),
techie, and entrepreneurial.
The selection mechanism and criteria for Deeshpande grants were distinctive from
traditional government grants. The project was awarded Deshpande money by the MIT
employees that administer Deshpande Center programs; the Liquid Metal Battery
project was allocated its first $250,000 to spend over the next two years. Bradwell
started using his time to explore electrochemistry with help from a post-doctoral
associate that had joined the group, Aislinn Sirk. Together they built the first working cell,
one inch in diameter and fundamentally different in the way it functioned. A third
invention disclosure was made.
After three application attempts during his time as visiting scientist, Bradwell was
welcomed as a PhD candidate in the fall of 2007. He admits that he has sacrificed his
grades to focus his attention on the Liquid Metal Battery project; he had become
increasingly optimistic about the commercial viability of the technology during the
course of the Deshpande Center grant, but there were still years worth of basic science
to explore before he could consider forming a business to bring the battery to market.
Arunas Chesonis: unrestricted but monitored gifts to university faculty
As the Deshpande account dwindled, Bradwell sought other funding options that
would give him the flexibility to start his own business in the event that the liquid metal
battery proved to be a viable product. His search ended when he and met Sarah
Wood, Executive Director for the Chesonis Family Foundation in November 2008.
Wood had just arrived on campus representing the Chesonis Family Foundation, a
private family foundation dedicated to bridging funding gaps in the innovation value
chain to develop economically viable technology as a driver of positive change. After
taking personal meetings with over thirty MIT faculty, Arunas Chesonis made a $10M
pledge to MIT over five years, 2008 through 2012. The money flowed as an unrestricted
gift to the lab of Chemistry professor Dan Nocera, who set up sub accounts for faculty
that Chesonis chose. It was through a sub account to Don Sadoway that the
foundation offered to cover four years worth of Bradwell's graduate student stipend
and discretionary spending in the lab for materials and equipment. In this way, the
dollars came directly from the foundation to Sadoway's lab via an unrestricted gift. It
was up to Bradwell and Sadoway to decide how to use the funds - no strings attached.
Like Deshpande before him, Chesonis fits the emerging profile of high net worth
individuals interested in science but searching for structures that would have more
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impact that simply adding to the university general fund. Chesonis had started PAETEC
Corp, a telecommunications company based in Rochester, NY, in 1998 when he was
only 35 years old. Today, at 48, he's halfway through a four-year, $10 million pledge to
MIT for unrestricted giving to faculty of his choosing in the School of Engineering and
School of Science. His grants come directly from his own family foundation and he
emphasizes personal interaction with the faculty and students that receive his dollars.
He wants to know what's going on in the lab and what keeps the researchers up at
night, hoping for an insider's glimpse of the next big thing in energy technology
innovation.
Only a few days after Bradwell received the pledge from the Chesonis Foundation in
December 2008, Sadoway was asked to stand in for Professor Ernie Moniz, Director of
the MIT Energy Initiative, at a presentation to Total, an oil company based in Paris.
During the talk, Sadoway mentioned the Liquid Metal Battery project that Bradwell had
now been working on for a few years. A group of Total executives approached him
after the talk, interested to fund any research in his lab that would enable storage for
residential applications of solar photovoltaics. Sadoway explained that the intellectual
property associated with grid scale application of the technology was off limits, but he
was willing to discuss sponsored research for residential applications.
Bill Gates: equity investments in capital-intensive startups
While the conversation with Total gained momentum into January of 2009, Sadoway
began receiving what seemed like junk email from Open Courseware, an MIT system
that shares faculty lectures on the Internet. The notes expounded compliments of
Sadoway's publicly-available lectures, but offered lists of suggested improvements - all
allegedly sent by Bill Gates. Sadoway ignored the spam until a past graduate student
from Group Sadoway and current Microsoft employee called to tell him that Gates
announced on a company retreat that he was addicted to Material Science lectures
on MIT's Open Courseware and was especially fond of Professor Donald Sadoway.
Shortly thereafter, Gates contacted Sadoway directly to arrange a clandestine visit to
MIT, citing questions he had about materials science and engineering. Sadoway and
Gates met for the first time for 90 minutes in September 2009, with Gates fully prepped
with landmark texts that Sadoway had sent from his personal library to Gates' hotel
room the night before. It was during this initial meeting that Sadoway mentioned the
Liquid Metal Battery project for the first time.
A few weeks later, in September 2009, Bradwell and Sadoway received two big breaks.
The first, a $4 million deal with Total to fund research in the lab at MIT, the second, a $7
million grant from ARPA-E, a new federal agency formed by the Department of Energy
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to pump funding into transformational energy research and development projects at
universities, national labs, and early-stage startups. Group Sadoway immediately
expanded from one soldier to an army of Liquid Metal Battery warriors, and Sadoway
called Gates to give him an update.
Gates encouraged Sadoway and one of his post-doctoral fellows, Luis Ortiz, to meet
with him in Seattle in March 2010 and to give him the update about the project in
person. Sadoway knew that the name, visibility, deep pockets, personal rapport, and
entrepreneurial experience Gates could offer as an angel investor would be
unparalleled to any other early-stage seed financier. Now was his chance to launch a
business to promote the Liquid Metal Battery.
In June 2010, just a few months before Bradwell was due to defend up his doctoral
thesis, Sadoway, Bradwell, and Ortiz founded the Liquid Metal Battery Corporation,
underwritten by a standard term sheet from Gates Ventures. Gates declined taking a
board seat or even an observer seat - the $2.25 million commitment was not a sufficient
enough portion of his investment portfolio to demand such a time commitment. Or as
he says "he doesn't know the business as well as LMBC does."
During the summer of 2011, when interviews for this case were conducted, the Liquid
Metal Battery Corporation had three founders, Ortiz, Bradwell, Sadoway, one full-time
employee, and a five-member board of directors with the Gates seat not filled. One
year later, in July 2012, the LMBC had almost twenty employees working full time off
campus and had closed a Series B fundraising round in June. LMBC has a worldwide
exclusive license on all invention disclosures from Group Sadoway at MIT plus all
improvements from on-campus research. Equity capital comes flows in via wire
transfers from "William H Gates Ill" directly, but LMBC personnel rarely interact with
anyone from the Gates family compound of offices - including the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation, Gates Ventures, and Intellectual Ventures - based in Seattle, Washington.
The LMBC team feels it has been made clear that Gates' investment is "not a profit-
seeking venture," but rather one made to address the Gates family's personal concerns
about climate change and ramifications on global health.
More poignantly, the Gates equity investment, clearly driven by altruistic intentions,
comes at the end of a string of like-minded investments made to push the Liquid Metal
Battery concept forward: Desh Deshpande, Arunas Chesonis, and then Bill Gates. The
similarities are striking: all three individuals bring to bear self-made wealth garnered
through tech entrepreneurship, are under 60 years of age, and support the technology
innovation pipeline in creative, philanthropic ways intended to create positive societal
impact in commercial markets.
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CHAPTER 1: Two Logics
The LMBC story is not unusual: Many science and engineering ideas developed inside
universities have potential for useful impact both in economic and social terms.
However, the funding sources that support those ideas do not reflect a mix of values,
but rather entirely distinctive logics. This chapter examines these different logics as they
shape the movement of technologies that are both potentially profitable and provide
opportunities for social impact from bench to marketplace. More specifically it focuses
on the funding gaps that arise between pure philanthropic capital in the earliest stages
of development and pure for-profit capital in later stages.
A wide range of powerful ideas in science and engineering have been developed
inside university laboratories; at MIT alone researchers contributed to such inventions as
the world wide web, human genome, transistor radio, email, GPS, the spreadsheet, and
treatments for hepatitis, multiple sclerosis, and cancer (Allis 2011). Projects like these
have had tremendous impact not only in social terms, but also economic terms through
opening up completely new markets or meeting existing needs for customers in new
ways. As the notion of Pasteur's Quadrant highlights, even ideas that make important
contributions to fundamental knowledge can also have usefulness (Stokes 1997).
Stokes recasts the widely accepted view of the tension between understanding and
use in scientific research, citing as a model case the fundamental yet use-inspired
studies of Louis Pasteur as he laid the foundations of microbiology. Pasteur worked in
the era of the "second industrial revolution," when the relationship between basic
science and technological change assumed its modern form. Over subsequent
decades, technology has been increasingly science-based. But science has been
increasingly technology-based; the choice of problems and the conduct of research
are now often inspired by societal needs (1997).
On this revised, interactive view of science and technology, Stokes builds a convincing
case that by recognizing the importance of use-inspired basic research we can frame
a new compact between science and the mission-based investors that fund research
and development, such as the government and philanthropists (1997).
As illustrated in Figure 1, science and engineering ideas follow a trajectory with a variety
of stages from idea conception to implementation.
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Figure 1. Idea to Impact Trajectory
At each stage, projects face a different set of stakeholders, challenges, and objectives.
As they move from idea inception to impact, ideas typically face two entirely distinct
funding logics.
1.1 Social Logic
At the earliest stages of university research, traditional funding comes from public sector
grants or private philanthropy.
Figure 2. Social Logic Supports University Science and Engineering Research
Grants from
Government
Grants from
Philan thropy
Universities
The rationale for this funding is clearly explicated by Arrow (1962), who argues that
there will be chronic under investment in the earliest stages of scientific research
because private investors will not be able to capture all the rents.
As a consequence, funding sources for science and engineering research where a
path to market is high risk and long-term are typically government or foundations i.e.
driven by a social logic. Broadly, the nonprofit logic's reasons for investment are social
goods such as clean air, clean water, and literacy.
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Philanthropy plays a major role in university-based scientific, engineering and medical
research in United States, contributing over $4 billion annually to operations,
endowment and buildings devoted research. When combined with endowment
income, university research funding from science philanthropy is $7 billion a year. This
major contribution to U.S. scientific competitiveness comes from private foundations as
well as gifts from wealthy individuals. According ongoing research on the role of
science philanthropy, it provides almost 30% of the annual research funds of those in
leading universities (Murray 2012).
The powerful role of the social logic in driving scientific funding is evident in the earliest
scientific research in the United States, which was supported exclusively by wealthy
patrons (although the federal government also began to contribute during the course
of twentieth century). Today, modern day patrons and government agencies together
continue to play important roles in supporting fundamental science and engineering
research.
1800-1900: science as gentleman's culture to specialization
In the early 1800s, there was no well-defined occupational structure for a person who
devoted his life to research. The word "scientist" was coined by an English philosopher
in 18401, but was uncommon in the American vocabulary until the end of the
nineteenth century. Figure 3 shows the usage of the written word "scientist" from 1780
through 2008 in the (American) English language.
Figure 3. Google books Ngram Viewer2 - "Scientist" used in American English
In 1834, Cambridge University historian and philosopher of science William Whewell coined the term
"scientist" to replace such terms as "cultivators of science."
2 In 2010, Google made a database called "Ngram Viewer" from nearly 5.2 million digitized books
available to the public for free downloads and online searches, opening a new landscape of possibilities
for research and education in the humanities. The digital storehouse comprises words and short phrases as
well as a year-by-year count of how often they appear and consists of the 500 billion words contained in
books published between 1500 and 2008 in English, French, Spanish, German, Chinese and Russian.
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In the early 1800s, Thomas Jefferson's cohort3 worked at science as they worked at
politics, polite letters, and farming; science was considered, along with Latin, Greek,
and moral philosophy, an important part of the gentleman's culture. However, by the
mid-1800s, science was becoming the property of specialists. By the 1840s, "men of
science" and "men of letters" diverged into two cultures, causing problems for financial
support of science. Scientists no longer had enough real world experience to stimulate
public interest and few philanthropists knew enough about science to effectively
subsidize its pursuit (Miller 1970).
Scientists were forced to act as their own entrepreneurs, taking every opportunity to
secure patronage and recognition for basic scientific research. There were no general
principles governing private philanthropy for scientific purposes. Family connections
between men of science and men of wealth, a comet passing in the latitude of Boston
to spark enthusiasm for astronomy, an industrialist's realization that economic
development created new career opportunities in science and technology, a
patrician's concern for the cultural status of his community, a robber baron's bid for
respectability, the winning personality of Louis Agassiz, the whims of an eccentric old
lady who became the first patron of the American Association for the Advancement of
Science: these were characteristic elements in the story of how science won its support
(Miller 1970).
After 1880, institutions began to organize in more formal ways and introduced a greater
degree of security and regularity into science, particularly at new research-oriented
universities. Philanthropic "foundations" managed by professional staff freed the
scientist of the responsibility to act as his own business manager and public relations
expert. Professional foundation staff could also command the resources necessary to
drive into the increasingly complicated and expensive search for knowledge (Nielson
1985).
In quantitative terms, public appropriations during the nineteenth century (as during the
twentieth) outweighed private donations for scientific research. Federal and state
agencies encouraged investigations that promised useful results, but politicians were
unimaginative and frequently timid. Inertia, ignorance, partisan politics, and a fear that
government support of science was somehow unconstitutional weakened public efforts
at the advancement of knowledge. Although more intermittent in their support, private
benefactors were free to innovate, to experiment, to venture capital on the unknown
and helped make possible the first steps in the social organization of modern science in
America (Miller 1970).
3 Thomas Jefferson (April 13, 1743 - July 4, 1826) was the principal author of the United States Declaration of
Independence (1776) and the Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom (1777), the third President of the
United States (1801-1809) and founder of the University of Virginia (1819). He was an influential Founding
Father and an exponent of Jeffersonian democracy.
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1900-1918: professionalization of philanthropy with little emphasis on science
Despite the professionalization of private foundations at the turn of the twentieth
century, efforts to link private philanthropy and university science until 1920 continued
to rely on individual research grants, which foundations found difficult to manage
(Kohler 1985). The Carnegie Institution of Washington 4 operated the only large grant
program prior to 1920, and the experience permanently soured its president, Robert S.
Woodward, on academic scientists.
1918-1939: post-WWI boom in giving to science
Fortunately, after WWI, science enjoyed unusual visibility and prestige; it was publicized
as being paramount to post-war recovery and progress. Consequently, foundations
invested $100 million in science between World Wars5 (1918-1939), primarily to
universities. By 1925, at least a dozen large foundations began to sponsor research on a
large scale, including the Rockefeller Foundation. These groups tended not to use
individual research grants but rather relied on block grants to groups of scientists or to
departments in a few leading research centers. Their overall objectives were to
encourage more organized, cooperative research and to build regional centers of
training for scientific manpower (Kohler 1985).
As an example, between 1918 and 1925, the General Education Board 6 invested $20
million in astronomy, physics, chemistry, and biology. Similarly, the Carnegie Corporation
4 Andrew Carnegie (Scottish-American industrialist, businessman, and entrepreneur who led the enormous
expansion of the American steel industry in the late 19th century) founded the Carnegie Institution of
Washington in 1902 as an organization for scientific discovery. His intention was for institution to be home to
exceptional individuals-men and women with imagination and extraordinary dedication capable of
working at the cutting edge of their fields. Today, Carnegie scientists work in six scientific departments on
the West and East Coasts.
5World War I began on July 28, 1914 and lasted until November 11, 1918. It involved all the world's great
powers, which were assembled in two opposing alliances: the Allies and the Central Powers. More than 70
million military personnel, including 60 million Europeans, were mobilized in one of the largest wars in history.
World War II was a global conflict lasting from 1939 to 1945, involving most of the world's nations and
eventually forming two opposing military alliances: the Allies and the Axis. It was the most widespread war
in history, with more than 100 million military personnel mobilized.
6 The General Education Board (GEB) was established in 1903 by John D. Rockefeller to aid education in
the U.S. "without distinction of race, sex or creed." The program included grants for endowment and
general budgetary support of colleges and universities, support for special programs, fellowship and
scholarship assistance to state school systems at all levels, and development of social and economic
resources as a route to improved educational systems. Major colleges and universities across the U.S., as
well as many small institutions in every state, received aid from the Board. The emphasis, however, was on
the South and the education of Blacks. Offices were established in Richmond, Virginia and Baton Rouge,
Louisiana to give GEB agents closer contact with southern communities. The Board was especially active in
promoting the public school movement in the early part of the 20th century. After 1940, programs other
than those for southern education were brought to a close; funds were nearly exhausted by the 1950s, and
the last appropriation was made in 1964.
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and Rockefeller Foundation each gave approximately $8 million to the National
Research Counci 7, which served as a trade association for science and developed
markets for PhDs in industry, created communication networks, and encouraged
cooperative research projects. These three examples played a major role in enabling
American scientists to participate as equals with Europeans in all fields of science
(Kohler 1985).
However, during the Great Depression8 , benefactors moved away from funding
institutions and back to supporting individuals. Culturally, emphasis was on getting
people back to work rather than visions of industrial research and development.
1939-1945: war-time science advances make strong case for post-war federal funding
In the years leading up the World War II, MIT's Vice President and Dean of Engineering,
Vannevar Bush 9, became aware of the poor cooperation in the U.S. among civilian
scientists and the military. In 1939, due to his concern about the lack of coordination in
scientific research and the requirements of defense mobilization, Bush started to
prepare a draft of a proposed National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) to be
presented to Congress. But when the Germans invaded France, Bush decided speed
was important and signaled President Roosevelt directly. He managed to get a
meeting with the President on June 12, 1940 and took a single sheet of paper
describing the proposed agency. Roosevelt approved Bush's plan in ten minutes.
NDRC functioned with Bush as chairman and others as members, even before the
agency was made official by order of the Council of National Defense on June 27,
1940. Bush quickly appointed four leading scientists to NRDC: NACA colleagues
Conant, Compton, and Jewitt, and also Richard C. Tolman, dean of the graduate
7 The National Research Council was organized in 1916 in response to the increased need for scientific and
technical services caused by World War 1. On June 1, 1917, the council convened a meeting of scientific
representatives of the UK and France with interested parties from the US on the subject of submarine
detection. The results obtained and the problems in the work were discussed. A further meeting with the
British and French was held in Paris in October 1918 at which more details of the work was disclosed. As a
result, the council recommended that US scientists be brought together to work on the problems. Due to
the success of Council-directed research in producing a sound-based method of detecting submarines, as
well as other military innovations, the NRC was retained at the end of the war, though it was gradually
decoupled from the military. The Research Council is currently administered jointly by the National
Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine, and its work is
managed by a Governing Board and an Executive Committee.
8 The Great Depression was a severe worldwide economic depression in the decade preceding World War
II. The timing of the Great Depression varied across nations, but in most countries it started in about 1929
and lasted until the late 1930s. It was the longest, most widespread, and deepest depression of the 20th
century.
9 Vannevar Bush (March 11, 1890 - June 28, 1974) was an American engineer and science administrator
known for his work on analog computing, his political role in the development of the atomic bomb as a
primary organizer of the Manhattan Project, the founding of Raytheon, and the idea of the memex, an
adjustable microfilm viewer which is somewhat analogous to the structure of the World Wide Web.
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school at Caltech. Each was assigned an area of responsibility. Compton was in charge
of radar, Conant of chemistry and explosives, Jewitt of armor and ordnance, and
Tolman of patents and inventions.
The coordination of scientific effort was instrumental for the Allies winning the Second
World War. Alfred Loomis said "...of the men whose death in the summer of 1940 would
have been the greatest calamity for America, the President is first, and Dr. Bush would
be second."
During 1941 the NDRC was subsumed into the Office of Scientific Research and
Development (OSRD) with Bush as director, which controlled the Manhattan Project
until 1943 and which also coordinated scientific research during World War 1l. In all,
OSRD directed 30,000 men and oversaw development of some 200 weapons and
instrumentalities of war, including nuclear weapons, sonar, radar, the proximity fuse,
amphibious vehicles, and the Norden bomb sight, all considered critical in winning the
war. At one time, two-thirds of all the nation's physicists were working under Bush's
direction. In addition, OSRD contributed to many advances of the physical sciences
and medicine, including the mass production of penicillin and sulfa drugs.
Of the war, Bush said, "...this has not been a scientist's war; it has been a war in which all
have had a part. The scientists, burying their old professional competition in the
demand of a common cause, have shared greatly and learned much" (Bush 1945).
Bush and many others had hoped that with the dissolution of OSRD, an equivalent
peacetime government research and development agency would replace it. Bush felt
that basic research was important national survival for both military and commercial
reasons, requiring continued government support for science and technology.
Technical superiority could be a deterrent to future enemy aggression.
During July 1945, in his report to the President Science, The Endless Frontier, Bush wrote
that basic research was: "the pacemaker of technological progress" and that "new
products and new processes do not appear full-grown. They are founded on new
principles and new conceptions, which in turn are painstakingly developed by research
in the purest realms of science!" (US Office of Scientific Research and Development
1945)
1945-1970: post-WWII boom in government support
Similarly, in an address on May 3, 1945 before the chapter of the Society of Sigma XiP at
the University of Rochester, Dr. L.C. Dunn, Professor of Zoology at Columbia University
and Chairman of the American-Soviet Science Society, agreed:
"The war and the sudden need to improve our means for supporting and
directing war research have brought into high relief an important fact which has
been dimly recognized for many years: there has been in the United States no
orderly means for the continuous support of fundamental scientific research, and
no policy or method for the deliberate utilization of science by our society.
Science has been a hardy plant which grew where and how it could, thriving in
the comfortable greenhouse of a research institute, or turning ample fertilizer into
real fruit in an industrial laboratory, or in the more usual case struggling for
sustenance in the thin soil of colleges and universities, occasionally enriched by
temporary growth stimulants from a foundation or private donor. Except in the
case of certain industrial developments and in a few government departments,
the support of science in the United States has not been the result of decision but
of chance, operating in a milieu [that] contained good scientists and good deal
of fluid wealth" (Dunn 1945).
Consequently, the federal government did indeed become more active in funding
science in the post-WWII epoch, most immediately with the National Science
Foundation Act of 1950, whose stated mission is "to promote the progress of science; to
advance the national health, prosperity, and welfare; and to secure the national
defense."
By 1950, in addition to the NSF, support for major areas of research were dominated by
more specialized agencies such as the National Institutes of Health (medical research)
and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (nuclear and particle physics). That pattern
would continue after 1957, when U.S. anxiety over the launch of Sputnik led to the
creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (space science) and
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (defense-related research).
1945-2000: charitable giving swells with tax deductions and a growing economy
Congress first imposed personal income tax on Americans in 1913, and it allowed
people to take an income-tax deduction for their gifts to charity starting in 1917.
10 Sigma Xi: The Scientific Research Society is a non-profit honor society that was founded in 1886 at Cornell
University by a junior faculty member and a handful of graduate students. Members elect others on the
basis of their research achievements or potential. Despite the name, Sigma Xi is neither a fraternity nor a
sorority, and today is open to all qualified individuals who are interested in science and engineering.
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However, the influence of the tax deduction before World War 11 was small because the
income tax affected mainly the wealthy. But during and after World War II, the impact
of the tax grew considerably; income tax rates rose and the pay of average Americans
increased sharply due to a booming wartime economy (Billiterri 2000).
Suddenly, millions of Americans were paying income tax, and they had a motivation to
shelter some of their wealth from the Internal Revenue Service by making donations to
charity. By 1945, the last year of World War 11, charitable contributions reported in
income-tax returns were five times as large as they were in 1939. Giving continued to
expand in the postwar era. In 1955, giving from individuals, foundations, and
corporations totaled $7.7 billion. By 1978, that total had grown more than fivefold, to
$39 billion. By 1998, total giving rose to $175 billion (Billiterri 2000).
Giving was fueled in the 1950s and 1960s by economic growth and the expansion of
the American middle class, pent-up demand for capital projects at colleges and other
institutions, and the increasing competitiveness of health charities like the American
Heart Association and National Kidney Disease Foundation.
As private giving grew, so, too, did corporate giving. Court and legislative decisions in
the 1950s and 1960s granted American companies wider leeway to support charitable
causes, and a boom in postwar corporate public relations efforts also helped corporate
philanthropy to grow. Corporate contributions reported on tax returns rose from $239
million in 1948 to $512 million in 1961. In 1998, giving by corporations totaled about $9
billion (Billiterri 2000).
Today: philanthropy continues to contribute importantly to university research
Over the period 2005-2010, the contribution of Federal funding to university research
has grown less than 1%, and State funding has declined (NSF S&E Statistics Report 2010)
Traditional analyses of non-Federal contributions tend to focus on the role of the private
sector as the complement to public-sector government funding in academia even
though industry contributes to less than 6% of university research funding. In striking
contrast, philanthropic sources - particularly foundations and institutional sources
(based on endowment contributions) - make up almost 30% of university research
funding and have been growing at almost 5% annually (Murray 2012).
1.2 Economic Logic
Once ideas have reached the limits of their potential inside the university, there are
generally two paths to impact - one is to large corporations through licensing. In 2009,
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academic institutions generated 0.26 licenses for every invention disclosed - down from
0.34 in 2000 (Shane 2011).
The other path, well suited for ideas with high economic potential but significant risk,
moves out of the university in the form of a start-up company. In 2009, U.S. academic
institutions generated 0.11 start-ups per license, off from 0.14 in 2004 (Shane 2011). In
both instances, the project confronts an entirely distinctive logic among financial
supporters - economic in nature and focused on maximizing profits irrespective of
associated social goods.
Figure 4. Economic Logic Supports Startup Product Development
Equity Investments: Venture Capital
Equity investments: Angels
Demo Demo
Private Corporation
Beginning in the post-WWII era in the United States, financial support for early-stage,
high-potential, high risk, growth startup companies was called "venture capital."
Professional venture capital firms make money by raising "funds," which own equity in
the companies they support. The typical venture capital investment occurs after the
seed funding round in the interest of generating a return through an eventual
realization event, such as an IPO or trade sale of the company.
Venture capital is attractive for new companies that have limited operating history, are
too small to raise capital in the public markets, or have not reached the point where
they are able to secure a bank loan or complete a debt offering. In exchange for the
high risk that venture capitalists assume by investing in smaller and less mature
companies, venture capitalists usually receive significant control over company
decisions, as well as a significant portion of the company's ownership (PrivCo 2012).
Venture capital is also associated with job creation (accounting for 2% of US GDP), the
knowledge economy, and used as a proxy measure of innovation within an economic
sector or geography. Every year, there are nearly 2 million businesses created in the
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USA, and 600-800 get venture capital funding. According to the National Venture
Capital Association, 11 % of private sector jobs come from venture-backed companies
and venture backed revenue accounts for 21% of US GDP (NVCA 2102).
Carpenter and Peterson explain that, "because of asymmetric information problems
and a lack of collateral, many high-tech firms, especially small firms, are likely to face
financing constraints.. .venture capital is the form of equity financing that is currently
best suited to address the capital market imperfections inherent in the financing of
young high-tech companies." That is, capital market imperfections affect firms in high-
tech industries in a disproportionate manner, underscoring the critical role of early-
stage capital in bringing firms to the stage where they can conduct an IPO." While
venture capital constitutes a relatively small proportion of all capital mobilized in the
technology space, it plays a vital role in bridging gaps between the earliest stages of
company formation - idea conception, intellectual property filing, prototyping,
manufacturing protocol research - and running a business that operates sustainably at
scale (Carpenter et al 2002).
In a working paper for the Harvard Business School written in August 2010, Gosh and
Nanda explain that because venture capital firms plan to make money from only half
of their investments, they need at least a small portion of their portfolio to perform very
well and to own a reasonable share of those successful firms at exit in order for the
venture capital firm to generate strong returns itself. Consequently, venture capitalists
have a bias toward investing in projects where the commercial viability is established
within a three to five year period. Similarly, to make many investments and realize even
a few successes, venture capitalists typically invest under $15 million per portfolio
company (Gosh et. al. 2010).
1920-1958: origins of modern private equity
With few exceptions, private equity in the first half of the 20th century was the domain
of wealthy individuals and families. The Vanderbilts, Whitneys, Rockefellers, and
Warburgs were notable investors in private companies in the first half of the century. In
1938, Laurance S. Rockefeller helped finance the creation of both Eastern Air Lines and
Douglas Aircraft, and the Rockefeller family had vast holdings in a variety of
companies. Eric M. Warburg founded E.M. Warburg & Co. in 1938, which would
ultimately become Warburg Pincus, with investments in both leveraged buyouts and
venture capital.
Before World War II, money orders were primarily the domain of wealthy individuals and
families (Wilson 1985). It was not until after World War 11 that what is considered today to
be true private equity investments began to emerge marked by the founding of the first
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two venture capital firms in 1946: American Research and Development Corporation
(ARDC) 1 and J.H. Whitney & Company12 (Ante 2008).
1958-1980: early venture capital and the growth of Silicon Valley
One of the first steps toward professionally-managed venture capital was the passage
of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958. The 1958 Act officially allowed the U.S.
Small Business Administration (SBA) to license private "Small Business Investment
Companies" (SBICs) to help the financing and management of the small
entrepreneurial businesses in the United States.
During the 1960s and 1970s, venture capital firms focused their investment activity
primarily on starting and expanding companies. More often than not, these companies
were exploiting breakthroughs in electronic, medical, or data processing technology.
As a result, venture capital became synonymous with technology finance.
The growth of the venture capital industry was fueled by the emergence of the
independent investment firms on Sand Hill Road, beginning with Kleiner, Perkins,
Caufield & Byers and Sequoia Capital in 1972. Located in Menlo Park, CA, Kleiner
Perkins, Sequoia and subsequent venture capital firms would have access to the many
semiconductor companies based in the Santa Clara Valley as well as early computer
firms using their devices and programming and service companies.
In 1973, with the number of new venture capital firms increasing, leading venture
capitalists formed the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA). The NVCA was to
serve as the industry trade group for the venture capital industry.
However, it was not until 1978 that venture capital experienced its first major fundraising
year, as the industry raised approximately $750 million. With the passage of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974, corporate pension funds
were prohibited from holding certain risky investments including many investments in
11 ARDC was founded by Georges Doriot, the "father of venture capitalism" (former dean of Harvard
Business School and founder of INSEAD), with Ralph Flanders and Karl Compton (former president of MIT), to
encourage private sector investments in businesses run by soldiers who were returning from World War II.
ARDC's significance was primarily that it was the first institutional private equity investment firm that raised
capital from sources other than wealthy families (The Economist 2004).
12 J.H. Whitney & Company was founded by John Hay Whitney and his partner Benno Schmidt. Whitney
had been investing since the 1930s, founding Pioneer Pictures in 1933 and acquiring a 15% interest in
Technicolor Corporation with his cousin Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney. By far Whitney's most famous
investment was in Florida Foods Corporation. The company developed an innovative method for delivering
nutrition to American soldiers, which later came to be known as Minute Maid orange juice and was sold to
The Coca-Cola Company in 1960. J.H. Whitney & Company continues to make investments in leveraged
buyout transactions and raised $750 million for its sixth institutional private equity fund in 2005.
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privately held companies. But in 1978, the U.S. Labor Department relaxed certain ERISA
restrictions, and under the "prudent man rule13 ," corporate pension funds were allowed
to invest in the asset class, serving as a major source of funding to venture capitalists.
1980s: declining returns leads to retracting VC industry
The public successes of the venture capital industry in the 1970s and early 1980s (e.g.,
Digital Equipment Corporation, Apple Inc., Genentech) gave rise to a major
proliferation of venture capital investment firms. From just a few dozen firms at the start
of the decade managing $3 billion, by 1989, there were over 650 firms managing over
$31 billion (Pollack 1989).
Subsequently, the growth of the industry was hampered by sharply declining returns,
and certain venture firms began posting losses for the first time. In addition to the
increased competition among firms, several other factors impacted returns. The market
for initial public offerings cooled in the mid-1 980s and collapsed after the stock market
crash in 1987. Additionally, foreign corporations, particularly from Japan and Korea,
flooded early stage companies with capital (Pollack 1989).
In response to the changing conditions, corporations that had sponsored in-house
venture investment operations, such as General Electric and Paine Webber, sold or
closed their venture capital units. Additionally, venture capital units within Chemical
Bank and Continental Illinois National Bank, among others, began shifting their focus
from funding early stage companies toward investments in more mature companies
(Lueck 1987).
1995-2000: venture capital boom
By the end of the 1980s, venture capital returns were relatively low, particularly in
comparison with leveraged buyouts, an emerging asset class. However, the late 1990s
were a boom time for venture capital, as firms on Sand Hill Road in Menlo Park
benefited from a surge of interest in Internet and computer technologies. Initial public
offerings of stock for technology and other growth companies were in abundance, and
venture firms reaped large returns (Metrick 2007).
1 The prudent man rule is a fiduciary responsibility of investment managers under ERISA. Under the original
application, each investment was expected to adhere to risk standards on its own merits, limiting the ability
of investment managers to make any investments deemed potentially risky. Under the revised 1978
interpretation, the concept of portfolio diversification of risk, measuring risk at the aggregate portfolio level
rather than the investment level to satisfy fiduciary standards would also be accepted.
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2000-2011: private equity crash
The technology-heavy NASDAQ Composite index peaked in March -2000, reflecting the
high point of the dot-com bubble.
The NASDAQ crash and technology slump that started in March 2000 shook the entire
venture capital industry as valuations for startup technology companies collapsed.
Over the next two years, many venture firms were forced to write-off large proportions
of their investments, and many funds were significantly "under water." 14
By mid-2003, the venture capital industry had retracted half its 2001 capacity.
Nevertheless, PricewaterhouseCoopers's MoneyTree Survey shows that total venture
capital investments held steady at 2003 levels through the second quarter of 2005
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2006).
Although the post-boom years represent just a small fraction of the peak levels of
venture investment reached in 2000, they still represent an increase over the levels of
investment from 1980 through 1995. As is shown in Figures 5 and 6, over recent years, the
industry has consolidated into fewer funds raising less money overall (Greeley 2012;
Kaplan et al 2010), but started to expand slightly last year.
Figure 5. Venture capital industry consolidated and retracted between 2008-2011
Year Number of Funds Fundraising ($M)
2008 212 25,179
2009 163 16,336
2010 173 13,559
2011 182 18,575
14 value of the fund's investments were below the amount of capital invested
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Figure 6. Commitments to U.S. Venture Capital Partnerships 1980-2008
In a time of scarce venture capital, entrepreneurs turn to angel investors, affluent
individuals who provide capital for start-ups without the support of a professional
venture firm. A small but increasing number of angel investors organize themselves into
angel groups to share research and pool their investment capital.
The angel investment market in the United States invested $8.5 billion overall in the first
quarter of 2010, down 6.5% over the first quarter of 2009. Similarly, the number of active
investors in the first quarter of 2010 included 124,100 individuals, a drop of 11% from the
first quarter of 2009. The decline in total dollars, coupled with the small increase in
number of investments, resulted in smaller deal sizes on average during the first quarter
of 2010 (Sohl 2010).
Data from the Center for Venture Research also indicate that angels have decreased
their appetite for seed and start-up investing, with 26% of first quarter 2010 investments
in seed and start-up stage and marking a steady decrease in the seed and start-up
stage that began in 2008 (45%) and 2009 (35%). This decline was recouped in an
increase in post-seed investing; 56% of total angel investments fell in this category in the
first quarter of 2010. The declining interest in seed capital represents a significant
change in the angel market. Sohl mentions that "without a reversal of this trend in the
near future, the dearth of seed and start-up capital may approach critical stage,
deepening the capital gap and impending both new venture formation and job
creation."
1.3 Summary
As outlined above, the social and economic logics are two separate domains with
distinct institutions, affinity groups, best practices, personnel, governing bodies, and
objectives. The social logic argues for investment in activities that promote social
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goods, while the capitalism-based economic logic states that companies exist only to
provide the maximum possible return to shareholders. Oftentimes, this conflicts with
serving the common good in ways such as promoting clean air and water, as well as
financial independence for all citizens. As corporations focus more on corporate
sustainability efforts and social responsibility, their business models may expand to
include more social goods in their day-to-day strategies and operations, but by and
large, the two logics are distinct and frequently stand in opposition of one another.
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CHAPTER 2: TWO LEGAL CONTEXTS
The distinctive funding logics are not simply the result of two distinctive sets of
organizations and interests. They are strongly grounded in legal institutions that clearly
demarcate the contribution of funds with either an economic or a social intent.
Moreover, they demarcate the nature of the legal organizational forms to which these
funds are traditionally provided.
Within the social logic, funds are typically given in the form of charitable gifts or grants,
enabled by tax incentives for the benefactors. There are clear legal guidelines about
what organizations can receive funds - typically "not for profits" or 501c3 - and why or
why not investments made are allowable in terms of the implicit social contract. A
supplier of capital must create a social good in order to deserve the tax exemption.
Within the economic logic, investments come from funds - angel, venture capital, and
private equity - and are given to corporations with complex governance requirements
and shareholder agreements.
2.1 Nonprofit Legal Context
U.S. tax implications for individuals making charitable donations
Since 1917, with the establishment of the individual income tax deduction for charitable
donations, the U.S. federal government has encouraged taxpayers to make donations
to charitable entities. In 1936, the federal government further incentivized charitable
giving by permitting corporations to deduct charitable donations from income. The
basic principle underlying the charitable income tax deduction for gifts is that taxpayers
should not be taxed on income that does not benefit them directly - they give that
money away to support the public good.
From 1982 through 1986, federal tax law permitted all taxpayers to deduct their
charitable contributions, regardless of whether they used the standard deduction (non-
itemizers) or itemized deductions separately. Under current law, donations to charitable
organization are tax deductible only for taxpayers that itemize. For itemizers, such
donations generally reduce taxable income and, consequently, federal income tax
liability.
Since the enactment of the IRA Charitable Rollover as part of the Pension Protection
Act of 2006, taxpayers aged 70 and older may donate up to $100,000 per year from
their Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) to public charities, without having to include
the distributions as taxable income. The IRA Charitable Rollover is an important recent
addition to the federal income tax code that further incentivizes charitable giving.
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In 2010, the United States boasted the most robust charitable sector in the world -
according to the National Center for Charitable Statistics, it includes approximately 1.6
million tax-exempt organizations. This includes over 1 million public charities such as
universities and colleges. According to the GivingUSA Foundation, charitable giving in
the United States totaled $304 billion in 2009 (Association of American Universities 2010).
Charitable contribution deductions are generally limited to no more than 50 percent of
a taxpayer's adjusted gross income (AGI), depending on the type of property donated
and the type of charitable organization. In general, individual taxpayers who donate to
universities and itemize their deductions can deduct: 1) cash donations and other non-
capital gains property in full up to 50 percent of their AGI, 2) capital gains property in
full up to 30 percent of their AGI.
A private foundation is a legal entity set up by an individual, a family or a group of
individuals for the purposes of philanthropy. In aggregate, private foundations in the
U.S. control over $628 billion in assets and made more than $44 billion in charitable
contributions in 2007. A private foundation does not generally solicit funds from the
public.
A private foundation in the United States is a charitable organization described in the
Internal Revenue Code by section 509. A private foundation is a 501 (c)(3) tax-exempt
organization.
Donor Advised Funds are held within and managed by another organization (usually a
charity). Fifty percent of a donor's adjusted gross'income is tax deductible for cash
donations to DAFs, while just thirty percent of donor's adjusted gross income is tax
deductible for cash donations to private non-operating foundations.
DAFs are limited to granting to certain types of 501 (c)(3) public charities, while private
foundations have greater flexibility in granting to individuals and for-profit entities for
charitable purposes.
Regulating U.S.-based private foundations
Prior to 1969, private foundations did not use available tools of auditing and public
reporting nor were they required to do so. Philanthropists assumed they were well
regarded by the community at large and that they could dispense with the need to
monitor themselves or to accumulate evidence about the nature or quality of their
performance. However, the American public became increasingly suspicious of the
private foundation as Americans began forming foundations at a rate of 2,000 per year
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It appeared to many that wealthy families were
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forming charitable entities only to avoid paying taxes and to garner additional benefits.
Philanthropists' reluctance to discuss publicly their failures and successes made private
foundations "symbols of secret wealth which mysteriously used the levers of power to
promote obscure, devious, and even sinister purposes" (Commission on Foundations
and Private Philanthropy 1970).
Recognizing the surge in public awareness of potential abuses by private foundations,
U.S. Congressman John William "Wright" Patman stood on the floor of the House of
Representatives in 1961, declared his concerns for the power of private foundations,
and initiated an eight-year fight against private foundations. Examples of his
accusations include: 1) overvaluing property contributed to foundations, 2) falsely
claiming gifts never made to foundations, 3) no reporting of self-dealing, 4) speculative
investments made by foundations without downside risk, 5) excessive expenses made
by foundations administration, and 6) foundations influencing the outcomes of
elections with tax-shielded dollars. Aggressive foundation lobbying defeated some of
the most stringent of Patman's proposals, but the resulting 1969 Tax Reform Act imposed
regulatory excise taxes in Chapter 42 of the Internal Revenue Code and has proven far
from toothless.
Specifically, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 imposed a series of limitations on foundation
activities, including:
- No self-dealing
- No investment in speculative ventures that jeopardize its charitable purpose
- Minimum pay out to charitable purposes
* No expenditures to influence elections
- No payments to government officials
- No expenditures for non-charitable purposes
The Internal Revenue Service enforces these regulations by imposing excise taxes on
private foundations that do not comply.
Initially, foundations were shocked and outraged by the Tax Reform Act, but over time
as abuses were eliminated, the philanthropic community reached a consensus that the
new limitations were "tolerable, though unwelcome." Many acknowledged the
benefits, especially the prohibition of self-dealing, but others focused on the "atrocious
tax on investment income and limitation on excess business holdings." This was
particularly the case because in 1968, 40% of all contributions to foundations and 70%
of all contributions to foundations worth over $100M consisted of stock in which the
donor and his family owned at least a 20% interest. Contribution of control stock in a
closely held business was an "extremely important source of foundation assets" before
1969 (Labovitz 1972).
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Notably, foundations immediately began paying much higher legal fees and were
forced to employ additional staff to comply with the new provisions of expenditure
responsibility. Instead of instituting operational procedures that ensured compliance,
many foundation administrators opted to avoid making grants to anyone other than
public charities. As a result, as one foundation administrator explained in the Spring of
1972, "[foundations] are settling into a routine that is not at all healthy...the easiest grant
to make is a general purpose grant to a public charity carrying out a traditional
program." In other words, foundations avoided innovative operational strategy, grant
structures, and program proposals, maintaining the status quo to avoid incurring excess
administrative burdens of complying with new regulations of expenditure responsibility
(Labovitz 1972).
The authors of The Legal Answer Book for Private Foundations contend that "one of the
most complex bodies of statutory law in the tax-exempt organizations setting is the set
of regulations applicable to private foundations. Created 30 years ago, the private
foundation rules are the subject of hundreds of private determinations by the IRS (and a
few court opinions), and this process continues unabated" (Hopkins et al 2002).
2.2 For-profit Legal Context
A century ago, U.S. companies that combined commercial banking and investment
banking dominated American corporate finance: J. P. Morgan and Company, Kuhn,
Loeb, and Company, First National Bank, National City Bank, and a few others. Partners,
directors, and officers in these banks held interlocking directorates in many of the
largest companies in the U. S. and also held shares in those companies.
In the U. S., this era came to a close in 1933 with the Glass-Steagall Act. That act
prohibited banks and their subsidiaries from owning shares in most kinds of non-financial
companies and prohibited commercial banks from underwriting or selling securities
(McDonnell 2002).
Today, banks use short-term debt and venture capital firms use equity investments, but
both institutions negotiate detailed covenants affecting many areas of governance of
the companies in which they invest. These covenants allow the investors to block many
decisions they find unwise or against their interests.
Fiduciary responsibility of the venture capitalist
In the case of venture firms with equity interest, the firm is an outside shareholder
without contractual claim to any specified stream of payments. Consequently, venture
capitalists are particularly vulnerable to managerial misuse of funds. To combat this
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threat, venture professionals frequently become actively involved in the day-to-day
affairs of their portfolio companies and negotiate a number of contractual protections,
including the right to appoint one of their principals as a representative to the board of
directors of the portfolio companies (McDonnell 2002).
In such a situation, the director has fiduciary duties to both the general and limited
partners of the VC firm that appointed him and to the shareholders of the company on
whose board he serves.
Directors of corporations owe a fiduciary duty to act in the "best interests" of the
shareholders of a corporation. Because most venture capital firms are established as
general and limited partnerships, the Representative Director, as a principal of the VC
firm, may also owe a fiduciary duty to the general and limited partners of the VC firm.
"Absent a contrary provision in the partnership agreement, the general partner of a
Delaware limited partnership owes the traditional fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to
the Partnership and its partners."
In the case of a Representative Director, he owes duties to two different organizations
whose interests may be in conflict. It is a "long-existing principle of [law]" that a person
designated to sit on the board of another company for which the investor has a
financial stake has "an uncompromising duty of loyalty" to the board on which he sits
(Hamilton 2009). This means maximizing financial returns for company shareholders to
the best of his ability.
2.3 Summary
In the nonprofit legal context, investors have a responsibility to prove to the IRS that they
deserve a tax deduction for giving money away in support of the public good. In the
for-profit legal context, investors have a fiduciary responsibility to make decisions that
will maximize financial return for shareholders. In both cases, investors use contracts to
ensure that they're fulfilling their respective responsibilities in the context of their
relationships with fund recipients. However, the intended outcomes of these
agreements could not be more different, and oftentimes they stand in opposition to
each other, undermining corporate progress on one hand or damaging social goods
on the other.
This raises the central question of this thesis: Are there mechanisms to bridge the social
and economic logics for ideas that have the potential for both forms of returns? More
specifically, are there legal vehicles that can be applied and used for early-stage
companies who aim to do just that? Would participation of blended instruments crowd
out or undermine existing single-bottom-line investors already in the marketplace? To
what extent are these tools applicable to the commercialization of economically and
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socially powerful innovations in areas such as energy and life sciences? What is the
extent of their application today? What are the limitations on future usage?
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CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS
The objective of this thesis is to analyze current financial activity at the nonprofit/for-
profit boundary of technological innovation in areas of social impact and to illuminate
barriers that prevent implementation of effective philanthropic strategies. In order to
achieve this goal, we selected a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. In the first
stage of our investigation, we conducted an in-depth qualitative scan of the nonprofit
and for-profit landscapes to search for appropriate financial vehicles that might blend
the two logics in one instrument. Next, during phase two, we conducted a deep dive
into two such vehicles - program-related investments (PRI) and mission-related
investments (MRI).
3.1 Phase One: Are there blended vehicles philanthropy could use to support start-ups?
Literature Review
To begin our investigation of the nonprofit/for-profit boundary, we conducted a
literature review on the history of philanthropy in the United States, including the history
of charitable activity broadly, the history of giving to science during the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries, and early-stage angel activity from the middle of the 1900s
onward. In this way, we built our working knowledge of sociological trends as well as
definitions for the plethora philanthropy-related vocabulary. Drawing from our literature
review, we started visualizing the nonprofit/for-profit boundary in terms of a spectrum of
investment motivation that runs from pure social logic to pure economic logic.
Legal Analysis
Once we built consensus around colloquial definitions for various philanthropic
vocabulary, we set forth to confirm the legal definitions. We did this by examining
federal tax law as well as soliciting input from legal experts, whose names appear in our
list of interviewees (Appendix A). U.S. tax statutes were re-codified by an Act of
Congress on February 10, 1939 as the "Internal Revenue Code." Subsequent permanent
tax laws enacted by the United States Congress updated and amended the 1939
Code. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is the revenue service of the United States
federal government. The agency is a bureau of the Department of the Treasury, and is
under the immediate direction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The IRS is
responsible for collecting taxes and the interpretation and enforcement of the Internal
Revenue Code.
Our legal analysis including examining the Tax Code language itself, as well as literature
published to clarify the rules, regulations, and prior rulings on relevant tax subjects.
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Interviews
After we gleaned working definitions of philanthropy vocab and governing Tax Code,
we conducted informal interviews with experts across the spectrum of social-economic
motivation: nonprofit staff, private foundation staff, private foundation trustees, private
foundation service providers, angel investors, corporate venture capital investors,
university development staff, venture capitalists, and other experts that could confirm or
debate our definitions. The list of interviewees can be found in Appendix A and their
feedback infused deeply into our findings.
3.2 Phase Two: What are the barriers preventing the usage of these blended vehicles?
Based on our investigation during Phase One, we concluded that two types of blended
vehicles hold promise for supporting science and engineering innovation at the
nonprofit/for-profit boundary: 1) Program-related Investments (PRI) and 2) Mission-
related Investments (MRI). I describe both in-depth in Chapter 4. During Phase Two of
our investigation, we used privately-commissioned PRI data from the Foundation Center
as well as interviews conducted before, during, and after a privately-organized event
held at MIT, "The Foundation Energy Roundtable," to assess the barriers currently
preventing widespread use of both blended vehicles.
Data Analysis
In order to assess how PRIs had been used in the past, we purchased a data set in
February 2012 from The Foundation Center, a nonprofit organization based in New York
City. Established in 1956 and today supported by 550 foundations, the Foundation
Center is a leading source of information about philanthropy worldwide. The Center
maintains the most comprehensive database on U.S. and, increasingly, global grant-
makers and their grants - a robust, accessible knowledge bank for the sector.
The information found in Foundation Center databases is compiled from IRS information
returns (Forms 990 and 990-PF), grant-maker web sites, annual reports, printed
application guidelines, the philanthropic press, and various other sources. In all, the
Foundation Center's editorial staff continually monitors more than 35 diverse information
sources to verify the details in its databases. New and updated grant-maker, company,
and grant data is updated weekly. New grant-maker-related news, job opportunities,
RFPs, publications, and articles updates daily. New IRS Forms 990 and 990-PF are posted
when they become available from the IRS.
For our study, The Foundation Center extracted an excel spreadsheet from its
databases with a list of all Program-related investment (PRI) data from 1998-2010, and
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including 23 available PRIs from years prior to 1998. Foundation data sources include IRS
information returns (Form 990-PF), foundation reports, and information reported to the
Foundation Center on annual surveys and through direct reporting.
Each line item of the data from the Foundation Center includes information about one
Program-related Investment, including grantmaker, recipient, amount, date, duration,
description of the grant, and other details about the purpose or intended use of the
investment. We used the data to infer trends about historical usage of Program-related
Investments in the field.
Roundtable Event
After defining philanthropic vocabulary, understanding federal tax language, and
analyzing historical data from the field, it was clear to us that the barriers to proliferation
of philanthropy at the boundary of nonprofit/for-profit endeavors in science and
engineering also include complex, cultural norms within the two sectors that would
have to work together: philanthropists and early-stage tech entrepreneurs. To explore
these barriers further, we convened a gathering of representatives from these two
sectors on June 28, 2012 to discuss a societal subject chronically under-funded by the
social sector: energy technology innovation.
The "Foundation Energy Roundtable" convened fifty thought leaders from philanthropy,
early-stage private investment, and energy technology and policy to discuss the
potential of philanthropic resources to address unmet funding needs in the energy
sector. The articulated purposed of the Roundtable was to:
- Convene leaders from two sectors that have not overlapped in the past:
philanthropy and energy technology
- Identify existing barriers to collaboration
- Build relationships between the energy and philanthropy sectors
Attendees and speakers from the Roundtable can be found in Appendix B. Through
rich dialogue, a cohesive set of cultural barriers to collaboration emerged, which I will
discuss in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS
My findings show that there are philanthropically-minded individuals and private
foundations with interest in supporting innovative start-ups that impact social goods, but
they do not have easy access to blended instruments to do so. This chapter outlines the
taxonomy, legal definitions, and real world examples of the tools that are available, as
well as enumerates the barriers - legal and cultural - that are preventing widespread
use in areas of science and engineering.
This chapter will focus on two blended vehicles - Program-related Investments (PRIs) on
the grant-making side of private foundations and Mission-related Investments (MRI)
made with endowment dollars.
4.1 Taxonomy of Foundation Financial Vehicles
Private foundations in the United States are bifurcated into two sides: 1) the program
side, which advances charitable mission by making grant expenditures and 2) the asset
allocation side, which maintains the endowment over time. On the mission side,
foundations are obligated to give away at least 5% of total assets every year. In 2010,
the country's 76,000 grant-making foundations made grants totaling $45.7 billion.
On the asset allocation side, $590 billion sit in U.S. foundations ready to invest. As Antony
Bugg-Levine explains, "if U.S. Foundations committed as little as 5% of their endowments
to impact investing (that is, money making entities that also do good), they would
create a $30 billion investment pool that is as large as the entire U.S. venture capital
industry" (2011).
The personnel responsible of each side at any given foundation have traditionally not
interacted, and they view their fiduciary responsibilities as fundamentally in opposition
to one another. One side is in charge of making money and the other on giving it
away. Similarly, foundations have used only the 5% required grant expenditure on
mission-related activities, but this is slowly changing; foundations are beginning to bring
the full weight of their assets - including the endowment - to bear on the issues they
care about.
As presented by Debra Schwartz from the MacArthur Foundation at Harvard University's
Kennedy School of Government, Figure 7 explicates the spectrum of tools available to
private foundations, with the mission side in purple and the asset allocation side in
green, and increasingly prevalent "blended vehicles" highlighted in the red box (2012).
Below I briefly define each tool with an eye toward the legal rules that govern them.
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Figure 7. Spectrum of Tools Available to U.S. Private Foundations
dMotivated by social good
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Traditional Investments
Since the inception of English Common Law in 121515, trustees and executors that
manage money or property for the benefit of third persons have been subject to
personal liability if they made irresponsible investments with those assets (Chernoff
2005).
In 1969, this concept found its way into the Internal Revenue Code's new "private
foundation rules" (Nielson 1985). Sections 4944(a) and (b) of these rules impose excise
taxes on investments that jeopardize the carrying out of the exempt purposes of a
private foundation. The Internal Revenue Service imposes these hefty taxes on the
disobedient foundation, its managers, or both (Chernoff 2005).
In other words, all charitable organizations exempt from income tax are expected to
permanently dedicate their assets to charitable purposes. Federal tax law parallels
state law in requiring that officers and directors of private foundations exercise fiduciary
responsibility to safeguard the foundation's assets on behalf of its charitable
constituents by following prudent investor standards, as mentioned in Chapter 2.16 The
tax code says that a private foundation may not "invest any amount in such a manner
is The essence of English common law is that it is made by judges sitting in courts, applying their common
sense and knowledge of legal precedent (stare decisis) to the facts before them. A decision of the highest
appeal court in England and Wales, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, is binding on every other
court in the hierarchy, and they will follow its directions. For example, there is no statute making murder
illegal. It is a common law crime - so although there is no written Act of Parliament making murder illegal, it
is illegal by virtue of the constitutional authority of the courts and their previous decisions. English Common
Law has been used since the original signing of the Magna Carta in 1215.
16 Under the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, the standard for prudent investment is
as follows: "each person responsible for managing and investing an institutional fund shall manage and
invest the fund in good faith and with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise
under similar circumstances." UPMIFA Section 3(b).
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as to jeopardize the carrying out of any of its exempt purposes." To deter a private
foundation from making investments that might imperil its assets, the excise tax is
imposed on the foundation and any managers that approve the making of a
jeopardizing investment - any investment that exposes the foundation assets to
excessive risk of loss (Hopkins et al 2002).
It is important to note that the Tax Code and Treasury Regulations do not define
"jeopardizing investment," and there exists no category of investment that is treated as
a per se violation (Weiss 2003). However, in 1972, the Internal Revenue Service published
a list of example investments that might be closely scrutinized as potentially
jeopardizing, including: trading on margin, trading commodity futures, working interests
in oil and gas, purchase of puts, calls and straddles, purchase of warrants, and selling
short. And in 1998, the IRS added new potentially jeopardizing investments to this list:
investments in junk bonds, risk arbitrage, hedge funds, derivatives, distressed real estate,
and international equities in third world countries (Hopkins et al 2002). Despite publishing
these lists as warning in the Regulations, the IRS appears to tolerate such investments if
made with care and prudence (Weiss 2003).
In order to exercise "ordinary business care and prudence" when making investment
decisions, foundation managers should consider:
- Expected return (income and appreciation of property)
- Risk of rising and falling prices
- Relative size of the investment within the portfolio
- Need for diversification within the investment portfolio
An investment will be deemed jeopardizing if it is determined that the foundation
managers failed to provide for the long- and short-term financial needs of the private
foundation to carry out its exempt purpose.
Similarly, the determination of whether the foundation manager acted with necessary
prudence is made by assessing facts at the time the investment is made, not
subsequently on the basis of poor performance in hindsight. General fiduciary principles
require the foundation manager to monitor investments, reevaluate the portfolio, and
sell any investments that become inappropriate.
Generally, an investment in a new corporation that is the sole producer of a promising
new product that must compete with an established product that performs the same
function will be a jeopardizing investment. However, if the corporation's management
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has a demonstrated ability to get new businesses started successfully and has received
substantial orders for its new product, the investment will not be jeopardizing. 17
If the IRS concludes that a foundation has made a jeopardizing investment, an excise
tax of 5% of the amount invested will be imposed. If the foundation does not remove
the jeopardizing investment during the taxable period in which it was made, an
additional tax of 25% of the jeopardizing investment will be imposed. Lastly, a tax equal
to 5% of the amount invested, capped at $5,000, will be imposed on any foundation
manager who participated in making the investment knowing that it was jeopardizing.18
Socially Responsible Investments (SRI)
SRI is any investment strategy employed on the asset allocation side of private
foundations (among other types of investors and investment managers) that seeks to
consider both financial return and social good; it is identified closely with shareholder
advocacy for ethical business practices. SRI almost always refers to publicly-traded
mutual funds that are either positively screened to include businesses with socially
beneficial practices, or negatively screened to exclude businesses that are viewed as
socially detrimental. Socially responsible investors encourage corporate practices that
promote environmental stewardship, consumer protection, human rights, and diversity.
Some avoid businesses involved in alcohol, tobacco, gambling, pornography,
weapons, and/or the military. Shareholders use their power of proxy voting to make
organizational impact based on mission (Sullivan 2010).
The origins of SRI in the United States date back to the Religious Society of Friends
(Quakers). In 1758, the Quaker Philadelphia Yearly Meeting prohibited members from
participating in the slave trade-buying or selling humans. Most applications at the
outset of SRI were religiously motivated. Investors would avoid sinful companies, such as
those associated with products such as guns, liquor, and tobacco. One of the most
articulate early adopters of SRI was John Wesley (1703-1791), a founder of Methodism.
Wesley's sermon "The Use of Money" outlined his basic tenets of social investing; do not
do harm your neighbor through your business practices and avoid industries like tanning
and chemical production, which can harm the health of workers.
The modern era of SRI evolved during the 1960s' climate of political activism. During this
time, socially concerned investors increasingly sought to address equality for women,
civil rights, and labor issues. Economic development projects started or managed by Dr.
Martin Luther King, like the Montgomery Bus Boycott and the Operation Breadbasket
Project in Chicago, established the model for SRI efforts. King combined ongoing dialog
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7 IRC Section 53.4944-1 (c)
18 IRC Section 53.4944 (b)(1)
with boycotts and direct action targeting specific corporations.
In the 1970s, concerns about the Vietnam War were incorporated into SRI. Many
people living during the era remember a picture in June 1972 of a naked nine year-old
girl, Phan Thi Kim PhOc, running towards a photographer screaming, her back burning
from the napalm dropped on her village. That photograph channeled outrage against
Dow Chemical, the manufacturer of napalm, and prompted protests across the
country against Dow Chemical and other companies profiting from the Vietnam War
(Lott et al 2001).
The Social Investment Forum, now known as the US SIF - The Forum for Sustainable and
Responsible Investment, was founded in 1984 as one of the first organizations serving
social investors. The mid and late 1990s saw the rise of SRI's focus on a diverse range of
issues and SRI is now a booming market in both the US and Europe. Assets in socially
screened portfolios climbed to $3.07 trillion at the start of 2010, a 34% increase since
2005, according to the US SIF's 2010 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in
the United States (Domini 2011).
Mission-related Investments (MRI)
Mission-related investing happens when private foundations make for-profit investments
from their endowments that further organizational mission and program objectives, but
also seek competitive returns for the corpus. MRI can include debt or equity vehicles,
seek market rate or above market rate returns, and leads with the economic logic while
seeking to incorporate the social logic as well. During the current recession, many
mission investments have outperformed conventional investment portfolios by fully
preserving capital and generating positive returns (Kramer et al 2010).
MRI products range from investing in community banks that serve low- to moderate-
income areas, to public equity funds that set standards and advocate for change, to
venture funds that support low-carbon technologies, to real estate funds that promote
social equity and environmental sustainability. Examples of MRI products include
Certificates of Deposit in CDFIs, Habitat for Humanity bonds, investments in the Calvert
Social Investment Fund, and clean tech venture funds (Brozek 2009).
The global economic downturn since 2008 has retracted foundation giving and
budgets of nonprofit organizations, only strengthening the call from grant-makers that
all foundations should invest their assets in ways that are consistent with and support
their charitable missions. U.S. foundations have steadily increased their use of MRI over
the past decade. Recently, the growth rate has accelerated substantially, as new
dollars annually committed to MRI have increased sixfold in the last three years.
Unfortunately, in 2011, the Foundation Center estimated that only 3% of private
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foundations make MRI as part of their asset allocation practice. Despite increasing
interest and foundation participation, MRI remains a fundamental challenge to
traditional foundation practice (Lawrence et al 2011). MRI today involves "relatively
small amounts of capital, a limited number of investment opportunities, high transaction
costs, and few qualified advisors or intermediaries" (Kramer et al 2010).
Trustees, who are responsible for approving the financial and operational direction of a
foundation, are crucial to instituting a MRI program. Their position within the leadership
structure of a foundation gives them a particularly strong ability to drive the adoption of
the practice. Perception of fiduciary duties, lack of expertise, ambiguity surrounding the
definition of MRI, and trustee-staff relationships complicate adoption of MRI strategies.
Although fiduciary duties of foundation trustees are predominantly a matter of state
law, there are a series of uniform laws that define fiduciary duty that have been
adopted by almost all fifty states. Of those, the Uniform Prudent Investment Act (UPIA)
and Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA) are relevant to the
practice of MRI for foundations. The UPIA, which regulates trusts and charitable trusts,
applies the standard of due diligence to be made to any investment to the total
portfolio instead of individual investments. Under UPMIFA, the language and stipulations
of UPIA were expanded to nonprofits, including most private foundations. According to
these laws, fiduciaries must act in accordance with the duty of loyalty; "solely in the
interest of their beneficiaries," and exercise prudence; "care, skill, and caution" in
investment decision-making (Wood 2011).
For charitable trusts, social considerations can be taken into account to the extent that
the investment decision can be justified, "on grounds of advancing, financially or
operationally, a charitable activity conducted by the trust." Fiduciaries can make MRI if
the investment decisions are made with the intent of fulfilling the purpose of the
institution and have undergone a prudent process of selection and judgment.
Foundations created as perpetual institutions face specific fiduciary responsibilities
related to that time horizon.
As Antony Bugg-Levine observes in his 2011 book, "if U.S. foundations committed as little
as 5% of their endowments to impact investing, they would create a $30 billion
investment pool that is as large as the entire U.S. venture capital industry" (Bugg-Levine
et al 2011). A number of organizations have recently begun new efforts to promote MRI
as an important vehicle for social change. Three major foundations have launched a
"More for Mission" campaign and have established a research center at Harvard
University to encourage MRI (Kramer et al 2010).
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Grants
Grants are cash expenditures made from the private foundation for charitable
purposes, none of which may be to the private benefit of any individual. From a
conceptual perspective, grant-making is the reason private foundations receive tax
exempt status, as their monies are shielded to benefit the social good. Grant recipients
count as charitable if they serve the exempt purposes set forth in section 501 (c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code: "charitable, religious, educational, scientific, literary, testing
for public safety, fostering national or international amateur sports competition, and
preventing cruelty to children or animals. The term charitable is used in its generally
accepted legal sense and includes relief of the poor, the distressed, or the
underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement of education or science;
erecting or maintaining public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening the burdens of
government; lessening neighborhood tensions; eliminating prejudice and discrimination;
defending human and civil rights secured by law; and combating community
deterioration and juvenile delinquency."
Additionally, mandatory "expenditure responsibility" means that a private foundation
must exert all reasonable efforts and establish adequate procedures:
- To see that the grant is spent only for the purpose for which it is made,
- To obtain full and complete reports from the grantee organization on how the
funds are spent, and
- To make full and detailed reports on the expenditures to the IRS.
Before the American Civil War in 1861, charity in the United States was viewed as an
individual's obligation of personal involvement to his local community. This obligation
manifested itself in personal time commitments aimed at improving the collective good
in the volunteer's immediate locality. However, during the period following the Civil War
through the turn of the 20th century (1865-1911), philanthropy was monetized and
bureaucratized. Individuals spent less personal time directly enacting charity and more
time organizing and sponsoring events in the name of charity. In this way, individuals or
groups of individuals could raise money to give to a cause by throwing fancy parties -
charity balls.
At the turn of the 20th century, the practice of grant-making started to become
professionalized, especially as those that garnered wealth from the Industrial Revolution
began establishing private foundations as legal entities. Interestingly, tax and legal
motivations were not relevant for foundations created before passage of the federal
income tax before World War I. More often, donors endowed their foundations near the
end of their lives because they felt they had no viable alternative to manage large
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sums of money after their death, leaving us with only about half of the large
foundations today created out of a sense of social responsibility (Nielsen 1985).
Today, the Giving USA Survey, an annual publication written at Indiana University,
reveals that grant-making to charitable causes has almost tripled in terms of inflation-
adjusted dollars since 1970, as shown in Figure 8 (2011). In 2010, grant-making from all
sources equaled $290 billion.
Figure 8. Total giving to charitable organizations: 1970-2010 (in billions)
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However, data shows us that foundations constitute only a portion of total grant-making
in the United States over the same time period, as shown in Figure 9 (2011):
Figure 9. Total giving by source: 1971-2010 (in billions of inflation-adjusted dollars)
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And although total grant-making in real terms has increased dramatically over time, as
a percentage of total GDP, total giving from all sources remains unchanged within .6%
of total GDP (Giving USA 2011).
Figure 10. Giving as a percentage of U.S. GDP, 1970-2010
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Unfortunately, despite increased professionalization of the field of philanthropy during
the course of the twentieth century, until the 1990s, many foundations did not
aggressively seek improvement in operational strategies or incentive structure of their
grants. Sarah di Troia, Managing Partner of New Profit lnc19 explains, "Many foundations
do not aggressively seek improvement in their operational strategies or incentive
structure of their grants because: 1) foundation management has historically been
viewed as a career for retirees, leaving the workforce aged and uninventive, 2) there
are no market feedback loops to indicate good or bad grant-making to philanthropists,
and 3) there are red herring feedback loops in the form of flattery from grantees,
potential grantees, and other parties with vested interests in relationship management."
As late at 1997, consensus emerged among philanthropic foundations that program
officers were disappointed with level of impact from grant-making (Sievers 1997). Social
problems were worsening despite the best intentions of foundations because
government funding of social services had decreased over time and a disconnect
19 New Profit Inc. is a venture philanthropy fund based in Boston, Massachusetts. With the support of
individual donors, and its partner, Monitor Group, New Profit provides multi-year financial and strategic
support to a portfolio of social entrepreneurs working in education, youth development, public health, and
workforce development.
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existed in the relationship between foundations and the nonprofit groups to which they
made grants. Grant-making processes left nonprofits spending time on selling
innovative programs, not improving their own organizations (Letts et al 1997).
Grants with an emphasis on the economic logic - "venture philanthropy"
At the same time, the tech revolution of the 1990s gave venture capital tools fresh
exposure and captured the imagination of philanthropy theorists. "Venture
Philanthropy," where foundations aspire to many of the strategies employed by venture
capitalists, emerged as a popular concept. In a 1997 publication of the Harvard
Business Review, Christine W. Letts, William Ryan, and Allen Grossman described the
impetus of this concept: "Clearly, foundations and venture capitalists face similar
challenges: selecting the most worthy recipients of funding, relying on young
organizations to implement ideas, and being accountable to the third party whose
funds they are investing."
It seemed that the same reasons grant-makers were disappointed with impact enacted
among grant recipients - operational inefficiencies and misplaced priority on
fundraising rather than effective programming - could be addressed by adopting
practices from the venture capital industry (Sievers 1997).
More specifically, a variety of key distinctions between venture capital firms and private
foundations became concrete recommendations for ways to improve foundation
operations, including: 1) risk management, 2) performance measures, 3) closeness of
relationship with recipients of funding, 4) amount of funding, 5) length of relationship,
and 6) the exit (Wallace 2005).
The differences in ways venture capital firms operate and ways private foundations had
been operating during the course of the twentieth century gave rise to one key
change in philanthropy during the 1990s: an industry-wide attempt to conceptualize
the donor as partner, not patron. This included foundations and nonprofits agreeing in
advance on organizational requirement in addition to desired program results,
foundation managers reassessing their own capacity for hands-on approach, as well as
the balance of their grant portfolios. Foundations began making longer-term grants,
demanding radically lower case loads from each program officer and providing
consulting services to grantees as a way to improve operational efficiency. Additionally,
many foundations introduced the "organization grant" in addition to the "program
grant" so that program innovation wouldn't continue to happen at the expense of
organization building (Frumkin 2003).
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In this way, the language of philanthropy underwent major transition at the turn of the
millennium. For example, "grant" became "investment," "donor" became "investor,"
"impact" became "social return," "evaluation" became "performance measurement,"
"standard setting" became "benchmarking," "grant review process" became "due
diligence," and "grant list" became "investment portfolio" (Frumkin 2003).
More recently, Venture Philanthropy has received criticism as a change in rhetoric only,
and not a transition toward innovative grant-making. Some industry experts believe that
applying the concepts of venture capital to a sector that is inherently different has
added administrative burdens on grant recipients that are more onerous than helpful
(Wyof 2004).
4.2 Program-related Investments (PRIs)
Program-related Investments (PRIs) are a particularly vehicle that fulfills the criteria of
being focused on charitable mission but also more aligned with the venture-oriented,
economic logic. Since 1969, they have allowed the infusion of foundation capital into
for-profit entities but count toward minimum grant distribution requirements. Defined in
Section 4944(c) of the Internal Revenue Code enacted 40 years ago, "program-related
investments" (PRIs) are an exception to the jeopardizing investment rule. Through
program-related investments, a private foundation can invest money - equity, loan,
loan guarantee, etc - in ventures that aim to achieve the foundation's charitable
purposes but do not otherwise meet the criteria to be a permissible business investment
(Chernoff 2003).
Legal Analysis: PRis in the Internal Revenue Code
To qualify as a program-related investment, an endeavor must meet three
requirements:
(1) the primary purpose of the investment is to accomplish one or more of the
charitable, religious, scientific, literary, educational and other exempt purposes
described in section 170(c) (2) (B)20 of the Internal Revenue Code;
(2) No significant purpose of the investment is the production of income or the
appreciation of property;
20 "For purposes of this section, the term "charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the
use of a corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international
amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or
equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals."
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(3) No purpose of the investment is to lobby, support, or oppose candidates for
public office or to accomplish any of the other political purposes forbidden to
private foundations by section 1 70(c) (2) (D)2 1 of the Internal Revenue Code. 22
The first prong - primary exempt purpose - requires a determination specific to each
foundation, its mission, and relation to the investment. There are two parts to the
primary exempt purpose test: 1) investment must significantly further the
accomplishment of the foundation's exempt activities and 2) it would not have been
made but for the relationship between the investment and the accomplishment of
exempt purposes.23 To meet the "significantly further" test, the foundation must
determine that the PRI is consistent with one or more purposes described in section
501 (c)(3) (Levitt 2011). The "but for" part of this test can be supported by foundation
managers through contemporaneous documents proving the true motivation for
investment. This documentation is useful if the investment, intending to serve a
charitable purpose, becomes profitable (Weiss 2003).
Second, proving that a PRI has no significant income-producing purpose can be met
by showing that the investment's projected rate of return is insufficient by itself to
compensate for the risk. It is immaterial if an investment produces significant income, as
the circumstances at the time of the investment are what matter. However, the IRS
does use profitability as evidence of purpose. It also considers whether a private, profit-
seeking investor would have been likely to make the investment on the same terms. 24
Third, the last requirement mandates that an investment must not be made in an
attempt to influence legislation or intervene in a political campaign. The focus of this
requirement is on the actions of the recipient of the investment, rather than on the
function of the foundation (Weiss 2003).
It does not matter whether the recipient of a program-related investment is tax exempt.
For the transaction to be considered a program-related investment, the type of entity,
tax status and domicile country of the recipient are irrelevant. The critical aspect of the
investment is that a charitable purpose will be served.
To underline this point, Revenue Ruling 74-587, 1974-2 C.B.162 made in July 1974 explains
"although some of the individuals receiving financial assistance in their business
21 "For purposes of this section, the term "charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the
use of a corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation which is not disqualified for tax
exemption under section 501 (c) (3) by reason of attempting to influence legislation, and which does not
participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign
on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office."
22 IRC Section 53.4944(a) (1) (i-iii)
23 IRC Section 53.4944-3(a) (2) (i)
24 IRC Section 53.4944-3(a) (2) (iii)
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endeavors... may not themselves qualify for charitable assistance as such, that fact
does not detract from the charitable character of the organization's program. The
recipient of loans and working capital in such cases are merely the instruments by
which the charitable purposes are sought to be accomplished" (Chernoff 2003).
Historical analysis: PRIs in the literature
There are more than 75,000 grant-making private and community foundations in the
United States, but unfortunately only 173 (.2%) made PRIs from 2006-2007, representing
$734 million of $91.9 billion (.8%) in charitable distributions made during the same two-
year timeframe (Lawrence 2005). Despite low usage in the past, application of PRIs and
the breadth of areas to which they are being applied are expanding over time due to
a number of inducements to foundation trustees and managers:
(1) PRIs count toward an organization's grant distribution requirements in the year
made; they are a "qualifying distribution" toward the mandatory 5% annual
distribution.
(2) There is a secondary return because the amount of the PRI reduces the asset
base on which the 5% requirement is calculated. This means that to the
foundation, a 3% interest rate on a loan will effectively given an 8% rate of return.
(3) PRIs come from a foundation's grant budget, not from its corpus, which sits in a
diversified portfolio of non-jeopardizing investments. Dollars spent from the grant
budget are usually not recovered, but PRIs will be repaid, earn interest, and can
be re-used in the future.
(4) Over time, with consistent (although modest) returns, PRI programs can pay for
themselves and perhaps provide increased funding for other charitable giving.
In the face of such strong incentives, Steven Lawrence, Director of Research at The
Foundation Center, hypothesizes that the limited use of PRIs results from:
- Limited experience and low capacity to manage financial investments among
potential PRI recipients
- Lack of predictable income stream needed for repayment
- Limited proficiency in the use of PRIs among foundation staff
- Reliance by foundations on traditional approaches
Lack of guidance of what is permissible as PRIs also contributes to the relatively small
number of applications; there are three limited sources of data about the permissible
use of Program-related Investments, including:
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1. Internal Revenue Code: general examples25
2. Historical Examples: as reported in 990PFs26
3. Internal Revenue Service: private letter rulings27
First, the Internal Revenue Code provides ten illustrative examples of tools that would
constitute PRIs, including:
- A small business enterprise, X, is located in a deteriorated urban area and is
owned by members of an economically disadvantaged minority group.
Conventional sources of funds are unwilling or unable to provide funds to the
enterprise. A foundation's below-market interest rate loan to encourage
economic development would be program-related.
- The private foundation described above allows an extension of X's loan in order
to permit X to achieve greater financial stability before it is required to repay the
loan. Since the change is not motivated by attempts to enhance yield, but by
an effort to encourage success of an exempt project, the altered loan is also
considered to be program-related.
- Assume instead that a commercial bank will loan X money if it increases the
amount of its equity capital. A private foundation's purchase of X's common
stock to accomplish the same purposes as the loan described above is again
considered to be program-related.
- Assume instead that substantial citizens own X, but continued operation of X is
important for the economic well-being of the low-income persons in the area. To
save X, a private foundation loans X money at a below-market rate to pay for
specific projects benefiting the community. The loan is program-related.
- A private foundation wants to encourage the building of a plant to provide jobs
in a low-income neighborhood. The foundation loans the building funds at a
below-market rate to a successful commercial company that is unwilling to build
the plant without such inducement. Again, the loan is program-related.
25 Reg. 53.4944-3(b)
26 The Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax, is submitted by tax-exempt and non-profit
organizations to provide the Internal Revenue Service with annual financial information. Form 990-PF is
available for private foundations. A short version, Form 990-EZ, may be used by organizations with gross
receipts of between $25,000 and $500,000 and total assets of less than $2.5 million.
27 Private letter rulings (PLRs), in the United States, are written decisions by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
in response to taxpayer requests for guidance. A private letter ruling binds only the IRS and the requesting
taxpayer. A private ruling may not be cited or relied upon as precedent. The IRS does have the option of
redacting the text of a private ruling and issuing it as a revenue ruling, which becomes binding on all
taxpayers and the IRS.
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- A private foundation loans a socially and economically disadvantaged
individual funds to attend college interest free. Once more, the grant is
considered to be program-related.
- Land purchased for land conservation, wildlife preservation, and the protection
of open and scenic spaces is program-related.
Unfortunately, these examples were crafted in 1969 based on how the Ford Foundation
made PRIs in the 1950s and 60s; when the regulations were being drafted, President
Lyndon Johnson's anti-poverty programs were climaxing and the examples mostly
pertain to urban renewal (Chernoff 2003).
Second, foundations report PRI usage in annual tax return documents. The Foundation
Center, which aggregates data from surveying foundations directly contends that PRI-
making "has diversified considerably in recent years." In the early 1990s, community
development accounted for over half of all PRI activity. In 2007, education ranked at
the top, with nine out of every ten PRI dollars targeting elementary and secondary
schools (Lawrence 2010). I explore PRI usage in the field below by using data from the
990PF form, as aggregated by the Foundation Center.
Third, the Internal Revenue Service has issued 97 Private Letter Rulings at the direct
request of foundations seeking guidance in PRI usage. The PLRs pertain to four distinct
asset classes: loans, credit enhancement, equity investments, and real estate. It is
important to note that any PLR is only applicable to the organization that requested it;
the Internal Revenue Code provides that it may not serve as precedent for others.28
The judicial system has failed to provide a consistent answer as to how section
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their opinions, others cite written determinations in contexts that are arguably
precedential. Depending on one's definition of "precedent," judges are either
interpreting section 6110(k) (3) narrowly or disregarding it altogether (Wood 2010). For
example, in 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court cited PLRs in Rowan Cos Inc v. United States.
More recently in 2010, however, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims denied AmerGen to
right to enter PLRs from the IRS into evidence in AmerGen Energy Co LLC v. United
States.
28 Internal Revenue Code section 6110(k)(3) states that, with certain minor exceptions, "a written
determination may not be used or cited as precedent." This provision derives much of its visibility from
ominous-sounding boilerplate usage by the Internal Revenue Service at the beginning or end of each
Private Letter Ruling (PLR), Field Service Advisory (FSA), or item of Chief Counsel advice. The provision clearly
provides an important caveat to taxpayers to whom written determinations have not been specifically
issued.
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Historical analysis: PRIs in the field
Based on historical data collected for an MIT working paper, we know that $42 billion of
the $290 billion grants made in 2010 (14%) went to education. And according to our
calculations, $28 billion of that $42 billion went to higher education (67%) and $3 billion
of that $28 billion (11%) went to science, engineering, or medical research. As context,
religion has been the largest recipient of philanthropic dollars for the past 56 years - in
2010, it received 35% of total grant-making from all sources, compared to education's
14% (Giving USA 2011).
Importantly, support from philanthropic sources - individuals, private foundations, and
corporate foundations - comprises almost one third of all dollars (27%) given to
universities for science and engineering research in the United States (Murray 2012). As
an example, Figure 11 shows the distribution of financial support for the top ten science
and engineering research universities as identified by the 2012 NSF Science and
Engineering Indicators. 29
Figure 11. Funding supply for R&D at Top 10 Science & Engineering Universities
i Federal
E State
1 Industry
I Philanthropy
29 The NSF Science and Engineering Indicators (SEI) is a record comprising the major quantitative data on
the U.S. and international science and engineering enterprise. Indicators are quantitative representations
that might reasonably be thought to provide summary information bearing on the scope, quality, and
vitality of the science and engineering enterprise. The SEI is prepared by the National Science Foundation's
National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics (NCSES) under the guidance of the National Science
Board (Board).
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And while 27% constitutes a major portion of support for science and engineering
innovation within the university, private foundations have not used PRIs to similarly
translate innovation out of the university setting, across the nonprofit/for-profit
boundary, and into the marketplace.
According to our data, foundations made less than 5,000 PRIs between 1998 and 2009.
Figure 12 puts this into context among total grant-making from private foundations; PRIs
constitute less than 2% of total grant-making for the years 1998 to 2009, and PRIs to
science and engineering constitute less than fifty basis points of all grant-making to
science and engineering over the same time period.
Figure 12. PRIs as a percentage of total grant-making: 1998-2009
1998-2009 PRI Grants PRI as % of Grants
Total amount given ($) 3,841,475,781 203,394,651,000 1.89%
Total amount give to science ($) 16,108,997 6,011,531,000 0.27%
No. grant recipients 2,503 1,238,201 0.20%
No. foundations granting 2,505 120,810 2.07%
Similarly, among all PRIs made, those to science and technology comprised less than
1% of total PRI among other charitable causes. Figure 13 shows the distribution of PRI
across sectors, including .55% to science and engineering projects.
Figure 13. Recipients by sector for all PRIs made: 1998-2009
Medical Science &
Research Technology
2% 1% Other
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To further contextualize the diminutive nature of PRIs made to science and engineering
innovation, Figure 14 illustrates that PRIs to science and engineering projects comprise
less than .01% of total grant-making from private foundations over the time period 1998
to 2009.
Figure 14. PRIs to science and engineering versus total grant-making: 1998-2009
Based on the data from the Foundation Center (2012), only 27 separate PRIs were
made to science and technology projects from 1998 to 2009. These 27 PRIs are
described in greater detail in Appendix C. Although few in number, most of the 27 PRIs
were given to support technology as it moved from lab-scale to commercial
development, demonstrating potential for this type of activity moving forward.
4.3 Summary
Private foundations in the U.S. have a wide spectrum of financial tools at their disposal
to effect change. These vehicles range from being motivated purely by social logic on
one hand and purely by economic logic on the other. For sociological and legal
reasons, the tools that blend social and economic logic - PRI and MRI - have not been
used widely in the past. However, for many of our complex, societal issues, foundations
are uniquely positioned to fill gaps where private, single-bottom-line capital and
government intervention fall short. They have the luxury of operating free of voting or
55
fundraising cycles, allowing investment strategy to stretch beyond 4-year or 10-year
time lines.
Barriers to creative invesment and giving strategies at U.S. foundations
Unfortunately, many aspects of foundation culture make innovative strategy difficult,
including incorporating impact investment strategies that would proliferate PRI or MRI
and bring the full weight of foundation assets to bear on the issues. To start, there is no
forcing function of performance review for foundation program staff. At most
foundations, quantitative performance metrics are self-imposed and efficacy is nearly
impossible to measure in terms of social returns. To compound this issue, foundation staff
are flattered by all stakeholders - grantees, service providers, colleagues, end-use
beneficiaries, policymakers - that depend on the monies the foundation supplies or are
not in a position to critique antiquated strategy. Grant recipients always want more
money. Tax accountants and lawyers will always want to continue their contracts.
Friends and strategic partners will not frequently feel comfortable critiquing a
foundation strategy when it is trying to do good. End-use beneficiaries will not tell
foundations to spend their money elsewhere. Policymakers are never in a position to
critique, but rather align themselves with foundation work for branding and good
rapport. So how could we expect foundations to implement innovative investment or
grant-making strategies?
Additionally, at most large foundations, professional staff are forced to decifer ill-
defined intentions of the earliest benefactor. And oftentimes, family ownership disputes
underpinned the establishment of many of the largest foundations. These are the
reasons the majority of private foundations in the U.S. pay out the minimum grant
expenditure every year (5%) and grants only go to nonprofit entities - program staff and
asset allocation staff have not yet been able to bridge the chasm of social and
economic logic.
Entrepreneurship in general and commercialization in particular of US-developed
engineering artifacts and processes are important ways to fulfill the promise of social
goods. Unfortunately, private, public, and traditional philanthropic players are falling
short in bringing new technologies to market, leaving room for impact investment funds
to fill the gaps. Although not-for-profit funding from wealthy individuals, family
foundations, and corporate foundations is widely used to fund science and engineering
research within the university setting, it does not fund the translation of ideas towards
greater impact. Grants typically vanish as soon as entrepreneurs incorporate and start
to pursue go-to-market product research, even if the mission of the business is
strategically aligned with the charitable mission of the grant-making organization.
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Barriers to MRI and PRI usage at U.S. foundations
Within the context of blended instruments that hold promise for the future, MRI presents
much more opportunity in terms of volume of money, but also complicated normative
issues around appropriate use of funds. PRI represents less money but is clearly defined
by regulation and past use.
However, there are a number of barriers preventing widespread use of PRIs to stimulate
science and engineering innovation. First, foundation staff and their legal advisors feel
the guidance provided in the Internal Revenue Code is insufficient for clarifying
potential use of PRI. The ten examples provided in the tax language were written into
the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and are arcane. The outdated and obtuse nature of these
examples leads to foundations avoiding making PRIs, in order to avoid the excise tax
penalties applied to improperly distributed funds. To combat this barrier, on April 18,
2012, the Internal Revenue Service released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that
would add nine new examples of investments that qualify as "program-related
investments" for private foundations. The proposed new examples illustrate different
types of program-related investments that private foundations may make. The Notice
was published in the Federal Register on April 19, 2012, at REG-1 44267-11.
The proposed new examples include the following investments:
- The purchase of stock in a business that will develop a vaccine to
prevent a disease that predominantly affects poor individuals in
developing countries.
- The purchase of stock, or the provision of a loan with below-market
interest rates accompanied by the acceptance of stock, in a business in
a developing country that collects recyclable solid waste and delivers
such waste to recycling centers that would otherwise be inaccessible to
a majority of the population.
- A loan with below-market interest rates to a business in a rural area that
employs a large number of poor individuals, where the business has
sustained damage from a natural disaster.
- A loan with below-market interest rates to individuals in a developing
country that was damaged by natural disaster, for the purpose of starting
small businesses.
- A loan with below-market interest rates to a company that purchases
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coffee from farmers in a developing country, for the purpose of training
poor farmers about water management, crop cultivation, pest
management, and farm management.
- A loan with below-market interest rates to an organization described in
Internal Revenue Code section 501 (c)(4) that develops and encourages
interest in painting, sculpture, and art by conducting weekly community
art exhibits, for the purchase of a large exhibition space.
- A deposit as security, or a guarantee and reimbursement agreement, for
a loan to a charitable organization described in Internal Revenue Code
section 501 (c)(3) that provides child care services in a low-income
neighborhood, for the construction of a new child care facility.
The proposed examples demonstrate that a wide variety of charitable purposes
may be served by program-related investments, including advancing science,
combating environmental deterioration, and promoting the arts, in addition to
the purposes demonstrated by the examples in the current Treasury Regulations,
such as providing relief to economically-disadvantaged individuals or
preventing deterioration of urban areas.
The proposed examples also clarify that program-related investments may
include activities in other countries and may consist of credit enhancement
activities and acceptance of equity positions in businesses in combination with
loans. One example includes facts that indicate that a potentially high rate of
return does not disqualify an investment from being program-related.
The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking states that taxpayers may begin to rely on
the proposed examples now, even though they will not be effective until the
Treasury publishes them as final regulations (McGuire Woods 2012).
In addition to abstruse tax language, a number of cultural barriers currently prevent
widespread use of PRIs. First, service providers, such as lawyers, tax accountants, and
money managers, are unfamiliar with PRIs. Few have learned about the potential of
PRIs and fewer still have worked directly on a PRI in the field. This leaves service
providers hesitant to approve, recommend, or advocate for using PRIs - most are
rewarded for avoiding negative penalties rather than taking risks in the face of
uncertainty.
Second, foundation staff themselves encounter sociological barriers, such as the
personnel themselves. We found that the type of person - demographics, educational
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background, and personal goals - that becomes a Program Officer at a private
foundation is fundamentally different than a venture capitalist. This means staff at large
foundations feel ill-equipped to make investments akin to the early-stage equity
investments made by the venture community. At smaller foundations, we found that
the family breadwinner continued to work full time on making more money, while his or
her spouse managed their foundation. Families rarely approach charitable giving with
the same rigor and creative strategy as money-making endeavors.
Third, the firewall between the mission side and asset allocation side of most private
foundations blocks strategizing about overall impact investment tools. The two sides
rarely communicate with one another and oftentimes see their fiduciary responsibilities
as fundamentally opposed.
Fourth, there are very few sources of reliable data regarding historical usage of PRIs.
Foundations can't use private letter rulings as precedent, and past examples of
permissible PRIs from the field are difficult to find aside from the 990PF forms aggregated
at The Foundation Center. This leaves very little guidance for decision making at
foundations and among professional service providers that advise them.
Fifth, entrepreneurs looking for financial support for their for-profit ventures are unfamiliar
with the mandate for private foundations within the social logic, including the blended
financial tools discussed earlier. Consequently, entrepreneurs do not know to
communicate their business objectives as charitable, even while many of their business
goals could be construed as such within the 501c3 language. In this way, the pitch for
an entrepreneur seeking a PRI from a private foundation would be fundamentally
different than the pitch to a venture capitalist. Currently, the educational rhetoric for
science and engineering entrepreneurs - at universities and in the media - does not
teach entrepreneurs to communicate in this way. It would be a paradigm shift for
business pitching.
Last, for entrepreneurs seeking philanthropic capital, the fragmented foundation
"market" is nearly impossible to penetrate. Although an entrepreneur might be building
a business that could significantly advance the charitable mission for a foundation,
there is a lack of affinity groups, centralized points of contact, or forums to meet
foundation staff and deliver information that might pique their interest.
In sum, there are high cultural barriers that currently prevent ubiquitous implementation
of PRI and MRI among U.S.-based foundations. However, our findings reveal that these
tools do have the potential to advance many areas of science and engineering that
hold solutions to global issues, such as health, environment, water, and energy.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS
Our findings directly address the questions laid out at the outset of our investigation:
Are there mechanisms to bridge the social and economic logics for ideas that
have the potential for both forms of returns?
Yes, private foundations have a spectrum of tools ranging from pure economic
to pure social motivation available for use in the field. Mission-related investing
(MRI) with the corpus and program-related investing (PRI) with annual grant
dollars hold particular promise as blended vehicles.
Are there legal vehicles that can be applied and used for early-stage
companies?
Yes, although infrequently, PRI have successfully been made to early-stage
technology ventures in the past. Equity investments, loans, and loan guarantees
are all permissible.
To what extent are these tools applicable to the commercialization of
economically and socially powerful innovations in areas such as energy and life
sciences?
These tools are applicable to tech innovation to the extent that companies'
objectives are "charitable," as defined by the Internal Revenue Code. They may
be applied in circumstances where mission is the primary purpose and single-
bottom-line investors would not be likely to participate, complementing existing
social and economic investors.
What is the extent of their application today?
Very few PRI have been made over the past forty years relative to overall grant-
making, with even fewer being made to early-stage tech ventures. Most PRI are
used to make loans that improve underserved, urban communities.
What are the limitations on future usage?
Barriers that prevent future use of PRIs for tech innovation are two-fold: 1) cultural
mores that decelerate innovation of foundation strategy broadly and 2)
sociological reasons that prevent ease of use for PRIs specifically. The legal rules
are in place and already allow PRI-making to tech ventures, but the complex
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sociological systems involved on both grantor and grantee sides prevent
widespread, rapid proliferation.
Assuming that the use of blended vehicles is something desirable for the advancement
of science and technology, below I briefly outline how policy makers, foundation staff,
professional service providers, and those already active in tech venture creation could
combat the high barriers to PRI usage in science and engineering. By taking proactive
steps to knock down barriers, together we might begin to successfully bring the vast
philanthropic resources in the U.S. to bear on gaps in the existing science and
engineering innovation pipeline or to change the funding paradigm altogether.
Figure 15. Foundations' spectrum of tools, mapped onto S&E Idea to Impact Trajectory
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If we were to stimulate an active community of philanthropists making PRIs and MRIs to
science and engineering projects, foundations that already make grants to universities
as well as private equity firms that already make investments in corporations might all
perform more optimally because they would be able to focus on projects within their
ideal time and risk profile. They would avoid having to stretch outside their own narrow
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investment focus areas to help bridge adjacent funding gaps. They also wouldn't need
to decline investments based on concerns about follow-on funding because there
would be more players in the pipeline with ready capital.
5.1 Policy makers
The U.S. Treasury is already making strides toward lowering the barriers for private
foundations to use PRIs. With the release of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in April
2012, it updated tax language that had not been modernized since 1969. There are
now nineteen examples where there had been ten for forty years. The obtuse examples
of the past have been criticized for preventing PRI usage in the field. Moving forward,
policy makers would do well to collect information about how the new examples do or
do not successfully effect change.
And while the additional examples in the Tax Code are a start, there are other actions
the government could take to stimulate PRI-making. One would be to aggregate data
regarding past use of PRIs, including private letter rulings, revenue rulings, and
information found in 990PF forms. At present, it is prohibitively difficult for private
foundations to decipher what is and is not permissible, both in the charitable purpose
language in the first place and the PRI language in the second.
Lastly, policy makers or governmental agencies could host cross-cutting, inter-
disciplinary educational sessions about the potential of philanthropic capital, or PRIs
more specifically. I'm confident many federal funding agencies that can only fund a
small percentage of applications they receive would be thrilled to work together with
foundations to fund a larger percentage of applicants, leveraging public monies with
private foundation capital. At present, very few agencies have staff dedicated to
working side-by-side with private foundations to complement one another, particularly
in areas of science and engineering.
Lastly, it is important to note that many foundations' goal is to fill gaps until more
traditional, larger-scale funder can step in, such as for-profit investors or the public
sector. Antony Bugg-Levine poignantly questions, "Are [the foundations using PRI and
MRI] simply in the business of letting government get away with not fulfilling its
responsibility to its people?" (2011). In my view, it would be prudent for the federal
government to track investment trends among philanthropists that make use of the
vehicles that blend social and economic logic, to make sure the public sector is not
missing out on opportunities to do good and recoup tax payer dollars in the short term,
leaving foundation capital to seek out longer-term needs.
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Charitable individuals and foundations may be filling holes or compensating for market
failures that should be encompassed by government intervention. By more actively
following the philanthropic sector, our public sector could observe when it falls short on
fulfilling its role to voters, misses opportunity to do good and receive upside profit, and
when its presence could avail philanthropic dollars to other charitable purposes. The
philanthropic sector can operate on longer time scales than our government and take
more risk with its appropriations because it doesn't answer to voters, but it should not
simply be allowed to step in when government intervention falls short. Both sets of
actors should play their part - government and philanthropy - by underlining their
unique roles.
5.2 Foundation benefactors, trustees and program staff
In 2003, Michael Marsicano, CEO and president of the Foundation for the Carolinas
said, "No country in the history of the world has so creatively and effectively combined
philanthropy and government service. When we as individuals, however, volunteer our
hard-earned dollars to advance society by freely giving from our own pockets,
government taxes us less. The government gives us a tax deduction. As a matter of
public policy, the law of the land rewards us for taking a personal role in the
advancement of society. We are able to give less to Caesar when we give more to
others. This is uniquely American and profoundly important. In America, government
sees philanthropy as a partner. And you can even use your tax deduction to contradict
government. If you believe the direction headed by Caesar is wrong, he will still give
you a tax deduction when you freely finance the opposite direction. Philanthropists
serve as an extended form of representative democracy. These individuals have been
empowered to spend what otherwise would have been Caesar's to spend."
The privileges described here are unique, and over the past century, there have been
successes as well as abuses of the privilege. But never do we see foundation
benefactors, staff, or trustees trying to do good with purposeful inefficiency or lack of
efficacy. Unintentional sociological factors and complex societal systems prevent
private foundations from consistently making asset allocations or grants that optimize
impact.
There are a number of bold actions that foundation benefactors, program officers and
trustees could take to enact this type of change in their own way.
Make purposeful hires on both sides of the foundation. Hire venture-minded employees
on the program side. Choose mission-minded trustees and money managers on the
asset allocation side. This way, program officers begin to feel better equipped to
assertively tackle impact investing and incorporate it into existing grant-making or
investment strategies.
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Bring the full strength of the family's business acumen to the foundation's charitable
work. Don't leave the grant-making up to someone in the family that is inexperienced
just because he or she needs a project or because the business-minded family
members are too busy. Philanthropic dollars are too important and too scarce to be
spent more frivolously than they would be in the family's profit-seeking ventures.
Break down the firewall between the two sides of the foundation. Make sure program
staff communicates frequently with trustees and wealth managers to approach social
issues with all tools in the toolbox. By using the full spectrum of available tools,
foundations will unlock full value of their assets.
Make it easier for social entrepreneurs to access the grant-making team. The
fragmented foundation "market" is nearly impossible to penetrate for early-stage
entrepreneurs, especially in light of the constraints on their time and resources. Work
together with like-minded foundations to form affinity groups that can serve as sector-
specific points of contact. Or identify a program officer that serves as centralized point
of contact for the foundation. Or put together events to meet entrepreneurs and learn
about their businesses' value propositions.
Asses the merits of impact investing - SRI, MRI, or PRI - and explore its potential to
benefit your areas of interest. Introduce trusted experts from mission-related work to
experts that have successfully implemented impact investment strategy in analogous
fields, such as community development and urban housing.
Think about the ways science and engineering could improve mission-based areas of
interest. Science and engineering receives a very small fraction of total grant-making in
the U.S. and an even smaller fraction of PRIs to translate inventions out of labs and into
the commercial marketplace, where they can make a difference.
5.3 Philanthropy service providers - legal, tax, wealth management
Similarly, foundations rely on professional service providers - lawyers, accountants,
advisors, consultants, and money managers - to help them fulfill their financial and
legal obligations. These service providers should stop saying no to impact investment
strategies without diving into the details. There have been a number of instances when
our interviews led us to believe that professional opinions dissuaded foundation trustees
or staff from taking risks when the advisor was not fully informed about the legal rules
that govern PRIs.
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Be aware when lawyers', accountants', or other advisors' incentives do not line up with
society's needs. Professional service providers are usually rewarded for avoiding
negative penalties rather than taking risks in the face of uncertainty, which might be
exactly the role that philanthropy needs to play in any given circumstance.
Conversely, service providers could take the initiative to help philanthropic clients learn
and/or access stakeholders to help consider and implement the blended vehicles
discussed here. Events hosted by law firms for clients - foundations and startups. Affinity
groups formed by money managers to introduce like-minded philanthropic clients and
to educate them about successful PRI implementation in the field. The convening
potential of service providers that serve multiple clients with similar questions is powerful
for all stakeholders, including themselves.
5.4 Investors, entrepreneurs and educators
There are also actions those playing various parts of building new ventures can take -
entrepreneurs, existing for-profit investors, and business school educators - to
encourage more participation from the philanthropic sector in high tech
entrepreneurship.
First and foremost, learn the legal details about blended vehicles to make it easier on
foundations to give high-risk businesses money. That is, by better understanding the rules
and tax burdens a foundation would take on by making a PRI, a new business would
more likely be able to appeal to foundation program staff.
Similarly, make a separate and different pitch for value proposition to those interested
in charitable mission. And for educators, offer business classes that teach entrepreneurs
how to think about this; the interests of the private foundation are very different than
the messages we currently teach business students to sell to venture capitalists.
Lastly, do not think of foundations as a "pile of easy money." As discussed here,
implementation of impact investment strategies is an uphill battle for private
foundations in the face of cultural barriers. Some argue it is at least twice as hard as
traditional venture capital, as impact investors try to build successful businesses that do
social good at the same time. Approach MRI- and PRI-makers with the same type of
diligence as a venture capital firm, learning about their investment theses and tailoring
approaches in kind.
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Appendix A. Interviews
First Name Last Name Organization Interview Date
Andrew Cockerill British Petroleum 9/15/10
Arunas Chesonis Chesonis Family Foundation 3/6/10
Bilal Zuberi General Catalyst Partners 4/6/12
Bill Aulet MIT Entrepreneurship Center 4/21/11
Billy Parish Solar Mosaic 9/15/10
Bonnie Weiss Child Relief International 4/9/12
Brad Smith Foundation Center 6/18/12
Cathy Zoi Firelake Capital 3/9/12
Charlie Lord SCRC 9/12/11
Corey Williams MIT Resource Development 12/20/11
David Wood Hauser Center at Harvard University 6/26/12
David Bradwell LMBC 9/9/11
Dhiraj Malkani Rockport Capital 2/2/12
Don Sadoway LMBC 9/9/11
Drew Fitzgerald Will & Jada Smith Foundation 11/11/11
Elise Zoli Goodwin Procter 10/5/11
Ellen Angley NSTAR 1/4/12
Emily Levanthal Prometheus Group 10/12/11
Gabriel Kra Elan Management 10/13/11
Gil Agnew Acceleryst Institute 1/10/12
Howard Anderson MIT Sloan 9/22/11
Hugo Van Vuuren Experiment Fund 2/6/12
Jim Bildner Harvard University 1/25/12
John Harrington Sheffield Corporation 7/25/11
John Currier MIT Resource Development 9/26/11
Josh Humphreys Tellus Institute 12/8/11
Judy Sager MIT Resource Development 9/26/11
Lili Steifel Steifel Family Foundation 6/27/12
Ling Wong Gate Foundation 6/13/11
Luis Ortiz LMBC 7/15/11
Mark Goodman Terawatt Ventures 8/4/11
Mark Orlowski Sustainable Endowments Institute 11/3/11
Mark Lester Forge Partners 9/15/10
Matthew Nordan Venrock 12/21/11
Nolan Browne Fraunhofer CSE 8/19/11
Peter Weeks US DOE 5/1/12
Phil Giudice LMBC 3/1/12
Rachel Barge Greenstart 11/2/11
Rob Day Black Coral Capital 7/19/11
Ruth Madrigal US Treasury 4/16/12
Sally Boulter Calvert Foundation 8/11/11
Steve Brown Merrill Lynch Private Wealth Management 9/27/11
Steve Reece Sun Catalytix 9/9/11
Tod Hynes XL Hybrids 12/19/11
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Appendix B. Roundtable Guests
Andrew Weiss Founder, Weiss Asset Management Participant
Aron Newman Associate, Booz Allen Hamilton Participant
Arrun Kapoor Managing Director, SJF Ventures Participant
Art Goldstein Chairman, Sun Catalytix Participant
Arunas Chesonis CEO, SweetWater Energy Participant
Bonnie Weiss Co-founder, Child Relief International Participant
Bradford K. Smith President, The Foundation Center Speaker
Cheryl Martin Deputy Director for Commercialization, ARPA-E Speaker
David Danielson Assistant Secretary, Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, U.S. Department of Energy Speaker
David Kolsrud President, The Funding Farm LLC Participant
David Wood Director, Initiative for Responsible Investment, Harvard University Participant
Dhiraj Malkani Partner, Rockport Capital Participant
Elisabeth Reynolds Executive Director, MIT Industrial Performance Center Participant
Gabriel Kra Managing Director/Chief Investment Officer, Elan Management Participant
Hugo Van Vuuren Partner, The Experiment Fund Participant
Jeff McAulay TechBridge Program Manager, Fraunhofer CSE Participant
Jim Bildner Trustee, Kresge Foundation Speaker
Joe Chaisson Research Director, Clean Air Task Force Participant
Joshua Humphreys Fellow, Tellus Institute Participant
Kacy Gerst Technology to Market Advisor, ARPA-E Participant
Laurie Burt President, Laurie Burt LLC Participant
Leslie Harroun Senior Program Officer, Oak Foundation Participant
Lili Steifel President, Steifel Family Foundation Participant
Mariella Puerto Senior Program Office, Barr Foundation Participant
Mark Goodman General Partner, Terawatt Ventures Participant
Mark Johnson Program Driector, ARPA-E Participant
Mark N. Peters Principal, Federal Street Advisors Participant
Mark Orlowski Founder & Executive Director, Sustainable Endowments Institute Participant
Matthew Nordan VP, Venrock Participant
Michael Burychka Director, Sustainable Development Capital LLP Participant
Mike Telson VP, General Atomics Participant
Neil Rasmussen SVP Innovation, Schneider Electric Participant
Pat Brades Executive Director, Barr Foundation Participant
Patrick Cloney CEO, Massachusetts Clean Energy Center Participant
Peter Weeks Former Advisor, U.S. Department of Energy Participant
Phil Giudice Former Board Chair, Center for Effective Philanthropy Participant
Ramsay Ravenel Executive Director & Portfolio Manager, Grantham Foundation Participant
Richard K. Lester Professor and Head, Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering, MIT Speaker
Robert Day Partner, Black Coral Capital Speaker
Ruth Madrigal Attorney-Advisor (Exempt Organizations), U.S. Department of the Treasury Speaker
Steve Brown Managing Director, Merrill Lynch Wealth Management Participant
Trent Yang Director, CU Cleantech Participant
William Page Senior Vice President, Essex Investment Management Participant
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Appendix C. PRIs to Science & Engineering Endeavors: 1998-2009
(27 total, listed largest to smallest)
PRI Maker Name PRI Recipient PRI Amount Year Issued PRI Description
The University Financing Technology Enterprise Park 1, LLC 4,196,898 2007 Low-interest loanFoundation, Inc.
Equity investment to support next
The William and Flora Hewlett phase of HyperCar product
Foundation HyperCar 2,000,000 2002 development as lightweight, efficient
solution to producing energy efficient,
sustainable automotive vehicles
The University Financing Technology Enterprise Park 1, LLC 1,996,276 2008 Low-interest loanFoundation, Inc.
The Rockefeller Foundation Netomat 1,157,421 2001 Preferred stock in software company
with low bandwidth technology
The University Financing Technology Enterprise Park 1, LLC 1,082,400 2009 Low-interest loanFoundation, Inc.
The Cleveland Foundation Cleveland Advanced 1,000,000 1999Manufacturing Program
The Samuel Roberts Noble To advance research and
Foundation, Inc. Oklahoma Life Sciences Fund 644,000 2001 development of technology in life
sciences
To provide early stage investment
capital and start-up support to mission-
Washington Research Amnis Corporation 500,000 2002 related ventures to assist eligible
Foundation institutions to apply patents,
discoveries, inventions and processes
resulting from their research
To provide early stage investment
capital and start-up support to mission-
Washington Research Performant, Inc. 350,000 2002 related ventures to assist eligible
Foundation institutions to apply patents,
discoveries, inventions and processes
resulting from their research
The Samuel Roberts Noble To advance research and
Foundation, Inc. Oklahoma Life Sciences Fund 350,000 2000 development of technology in life
sciences
The Samuel Roberts Noble To advance research and
Foundation, Inc. Oklahoma Life Sciences Fund 322,000 2002 development of technology in life
sciences
Todd Wagner Foundation RocKnot, Inc. 300,000 2003 Toward development and launch ofRemedy software suite products
To develop and market laboratory
Washington Research Amnis Corporation 292,682 2004 instrument (high speed cell imager)
Foundation developed by University of Washington
researchers
Washington Research To develop and market laboratory
Foundation Teranode 268,750 2004 research software development by
University of Washington researchers
To support next phase of HyperCar
The William and Flora Hewlett product development as lightweight,
Foundation HyperCar 264,000 2004 efficient solution to producing energy
efficient, sustainable automotive
vehicles
To support next phase of HyperCar
The William and Flora Hewlett product development as lightweight,
Foundation HyperCar 250,005 2006 efficient solution to producing energy
efficient, sustainable automotive
vehicles
Continued on the next page.
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Appendix C continued. All PRIs to Science & Engineering Endeavors: 1998-2009
To support next phase of HyperCar
product development as lightweight,The William and Flora Hewlett HyperCar 250,005 2005 efficient solution to producing energy
Foundation efficient, sustainable automotive
vehicles
Loan for operations of software
company focused on developing and
Todd Wagner Foundation RocKnot, Inc. 218,000 2004 marketing tools for Remedy suite of
products
To provide early stage investment
capital and start-up support to mission-
Washington Research TraceDetect 180,000 2002 related ventures to assist eligible
Foundation institutions to apply patents,
discoveries, inventions and processes
resulting from their research
To provide early stage investment
capital and start-up support to mission-
Washington Research Consystant Design Technologies 125,020 2002 related ventures to assist eligible
Foundation institutions to apply patents,
discoveries, inventions and processes
resulting from their research
New Hampshire Charitable Seacoast Science Center 100,000 2002 Loan to cover cash flow shortage
Foundation during transition period
To advance research and
The Samuel Roberts Noble Oklahoma Life Sciences Fund 84,000 2003 development of technology in lifeFoundation, Inc. sciences
To advance research and
The Samuel Roberts Noble Oklahoma Life Sciences Fund 53,255 2004 development of technology in life
Foundation, Inc. sciences
To develop and market laboratoryWashington Research Teranode 50,000 2003 research software development byFoundation University of Washington researchers
To advance research and
The Samuel Roberts Noble Oklahoma Life Sciences Fund 49,285 2006 development of technology in life
Foundation, Inc. sciences
To provide early stage investment
capital and start-up support to mission-
Washington Research Therus Corporation 20,000 2002 related ventures to assist eligible
Foundation institutions to apply patents,
discoveries, inventions and processes
resulting from their research
Town of Amherst Virmatics, LLC 5,000 2004Development Corporation V L 5 2
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